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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the use of indirect coercion as an element of 
political warfare and as a policy option for the United States. This thesis synthesizes the 
concepts of indirect strategy and coercion to provide a cost-effective policy option for 
U.S. decision makers. In order to establish the strategic utility of indirect coercion, this 
thesis examines the conditions that are necessary for successful coercion of an adversary 
using limited military and economic resources. This thesis examines four historical cases 
of indirect coercion. The cases examined are Indonesia, Italy, and Chile during the early 
Cold War era, and Hezbollah as an ongoing case—to explore the varying outcomes, from 
success to complete failure. The analysis of the case studies examines surrogate targeting, 
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A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the use of indirect coercion as an element 
of Political Warfare and as a policy option for the United States (U.S.). In essence, this 
thesis will synthesize the concept of indirect strategy and coercion to provide a cost 
effective policy option for the U.S. decision makers. The concept of the indirect 
approach, developed by strategist B. H. Liddell Hart, is applicable to political warfare 
just as it is to conventional warfare. Rather than confronting an adversary with the 
expected frontal assault at the main point of contention, it can be more useful to address a 
problem from an oblique and unexpected direction. This is best brought to light in Liddell 
Hart’s book Strategy through the quote: “The object of obliquity is to find the chink in 
the armour, the mental armour at that.”1 The concept of obliquity allows for the expanded 
application of indirect strategy to the realm of political warfare. The utility of this 
strategy as a means in political warfare can be determined by the overall intended 
outcome. The concept of obliquity should illuminate the merit of an indirect strategy to 
U.S. decision makers, especially in a resource constrained environment. 
In order to establish the strategic utility of indirect coercion, this thesis will 
examine the conditions that are necessary using limited military and economic resources, 
for successful coercion of an adversary. The goal of this thesis is to help future strategic 
planners understand how and when indirect coercion might be the most efficient and 
effective option for achieving national goals.  
The empirical scope of the proposed research will consist of cases where indirect 
coercion was the primary means of achieving strategic goals. Initial research indicates 
that there is in-depth research on direct coercive diplomacy through political, economic 
and military means, while very little research has been done on coercion conducted via 
                                                 
1 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, Second ed. (London, England: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1967), 383.  
 2
indirect means.2 This thesis applies the pre-existing research on direct coercion to 
historical cases of indirect coercion. The cases will be organized by the degree of success 
from highly effective to complete failure. In addition, the case studies utilized will be 
from the post- World War II era up to the current conflicts of the 21st century.  
B. BACKGROUND 
With the end of U.S. involvement in Iraq, and troop withdrawal timetables for 
Afghanistan rapidly approaching, this era of long and drawn out conflicts is winding 
down. Additionally, the decade long state of war has taken a large financial toll on the 
United States. The utilization of indirect means to coerce a hostile government or 
occupying power provides national policy makers a cost effective means to pursue U.S. 
goals and interests. Moving forward, the U.S. will likely seek to accomplish its goals with 
minimal financial obligation and military presence. This strategy is clearly stated by 
President Obama and then Secretary of Defense Panetta in the strategic guidance issued 
in January 2012, “we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches 
to achieve our security objectives.”3  
Political warfare has historically been used to satisfy all manner of policy 
requirements without committing to traditional warfare. National decision makers require 
options to coerce and influence adversaries to act in a manner that benefits the U.S. 
Where invasion or conventional warfare is not desirable, coercion through a surrogate 
remains a viable option.  
Political warfare, the use of all national instruments short of all-out war, was 
utilized throughout the Cold War to achieve U.S. goals and to limit the global influence 
of the Soviet Union. Political warfare provided U.S. policy makers the ability to influence 
nations from falling under leftist control and undermine Soviet regional goals while 
avoiding a large-scale confrontation.  
                                                 
2 Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: 
Laos-Cuba-Vietnam (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 268; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms 
and Influence (New Haven: Yale University, 1966), 312.  
3 Leon Panetta, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” Department 
of Defense, accessed February 10, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis intends to answer the following question in an effort to analyze the 
strategic utility and feasibility of coercion conducted in an indirect manner: Under what 
conditions is indirect coercion successful? This thesis will examine the underlying 
conditions and factors that are necessary for indirect coercion to be an effective policy 
option. 
D. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
We hypothesize that identifying the conditions that make indirect coercion 
successful will make it a more viable policy option for political and military decision 
makers. Knowing these conditions will not only allow decision makers to identify when 
the conditions are present, but ultimately may allow decision makers to create the 
conditions for a strategy of indirect coercion to successfully achieve goals with minimal 
economic and military investment. We will begin our analysis with four specific factors 
and their link to the success or failure of the indirect coercion campaigns; the surrogate 
targeting process, the surrogate-centric versus sponsor-centric nature of the campaign, 
whether the campaign is covert or overt, and inducements used as an alternative action to 
the coercion campaign. Selection of these four factors is explained in the Methodology 
section. At the same time, we will also attempt to identify additional factors associated 
with successful indirect coercion. 
Coercion conducted through a surrogate is the act of contracting a third party to 
influence the behavior of a target. Kathleen M. Eisenhardt describes this contractual 
relationship in her paper “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review.” Specifically she 
describes the agency relationship as one “in which one party (the principal) delegates 
work to another (the agent) who performs that work.”4 Laffont and Martimort address the 
problem of this contractual relationship by stating “Delegation of a task to an agent who 
has different objectives than the principal who delegates this task is problematic when 
                                                 
4 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” The Academy of 
Management Review 14, no. 1 (1989): 58.  
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information about the agent is imperfect.”5 The importance of contracting the right 
surrogate, as opposed to the available one, is important to the successful outcome of any 
operation. 
The relationship between the sponsor and the surrogate is similar to that of an 
international joint business venture: two entities team up to profit by achieving a common 
objective. In their research on international joint ventures, Beamish and Delios emphasize 
“the importance of establishing congruity in performance objectives when establishing an 
IJV (International Joint Venture).”6 Their research shows that when corporations ensure 
their goals are congruent with their partners, they are more likely to succeed in achieving 
the objectives. This research, in addition to the principal-agent theory, is the basis from 
which we selected the first factor concerning surrogate targeting. 
In recent military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan it has been common to hear 
the phrase “put an Iraqi/Afghani face on it.” This phrase illuminates our second factor for 
analysis, the sponsor versus surrogate centricity of the campaign. If the operations have a 
“surrogate face” on them and the surrogate truly represents the population, the campaign 
is more likely to have enduring support and less likely to suffer negative 2nd and 3rd 
order effects during and after the fight. An example of the centricity issue can be seen in 
the Cuban support of the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MLPA) 
during the Angolan civil war. The Cubans who trained and assisted the MLPA were 
specifically selected to blend in with their African counterparts. The Cubans were easily 
identified as foreigners, which contributed to the difficulties in appealing to the 
indigenous population of Angola.7 Ensuring that a surrogate campaign appeals to the 
broader population is critical and can be the determining factor for long-term success. 
The choice of making a relationship between the sponsor and the surrogate covert 
or overt is critical in planning a campaign of indirect coercion. Exposure of the 
                                                 
5 Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 2.  
6 Paul W. Beamish and J. Peter Killing, eds., Cooperative Strategies: European Perspectives (San 
Francisco: The New Lexington Press, 1997), 120.  
7 Edward George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito 
Cuanavale (New York: Frank Cass, 2005).  
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relationship can be detrimental to the success based on public perception, both to the 
sponsor and target countries. In his research on this topic, Treverton states “If open 
identification with the United States is the kiss of death, then supporting America’s 
friends will only crush them in our embrace.” He maintains, “the presumption that covert 
aid can be kept tolerably secret…becomes more and more unreasonable in the 
contemporary world.”8 The ability to analyze the situation and determine whether covert 
operations are required to achieve the goals of coercion is necessary from the conception 
of the campaign. 
The last factor for analysis is the use of positive inducements. Positive 
inducements have the potential to change an adversary’s political will, similar to coercive 
efforts. Our hypothesis is that these inducements used as a compliment to coercion will 
produce better long-term results than either used individually. Professor Miroslav Nincic 
wrote that the “aim of positive inducements to an adversarial regime is to transform the 
other sides basic priorities, such that bribes and punishment become less necessary.”9 We 
suggest that using inducements together with indirect coercion makes success more 
likely, as well as more durable. 
In determining these factors, we examined several other factors that are applicable 
to analyzing insurgencies and resistance movements. Organizational effectiveness, 
motivation, and perceived legitimacy are some of the main factors that can be used to 
analyze these types of groups.10 They are somewhat generic and do not specifically get to 
the nature of the relationship between the sponsor and the surrogate. The ability of the 
surrogate group to mobilize the population is another factor that was considered, but 
ultimately not chosen. This factor was determined to be best suited for armed insurgency 
campaigns as opposed to indirect coercion.  
                                                 
8 Gregory F. Treverton, “From “Covert” to Overt,” Daedalus 116, no. 2 (Spring, 1987): 113.  
9 Miroslav Nincic, “Getting what You Want: Positive Inducements in International Relations,” 
International Security 35, No. 1 (2010): 139.  
10 Paul K. Davis et al., Understanding and Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2012).  
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1. Hypothesis  
Indirect coercion will be a more viable policy option for political and military 
decision makers if there is a better process to identify the conditions that make indirect 
coercion successful. 
2. Supporting Hypotheses 
a. Hypothesis 1 
A process of identifying potential surrogates based on their influence on the target 
population and their political goals increases the success of an indirect coercion 
campaign. 
b. Hypothesis 2 
A coercion campaign that is surrogate-centric, rather than sponsor-centric, is more 
likely to achieve the intended goals and less likely to be viewed as illegitimate in the 
target country. 
c. Hypothesis 3  
A successful campaign of indirect coercion can be either covert or overt in nature. 
d. Hypothesis 4 
Positive inducements can increase the effectiveness of indirect coercion in 
political warfare based on analysis of target vulnerabilities. 
3. Critical Definitions 
The following definitions are provided to form a common understanding of key 
terms. 
 7
a. Coercive Diplomacy 
Coercion means “to compel or force to do anything,” or “to constrain or restrain 
by the application of superior force.”11 In other words, coercion is one entity restricting 
the free-will or freedom of choice of another entity by applying pressure: either physical, 
psychological or economic. It can be deduced from this definition that there are three 
possible intended effects of coercion: for the target not to act, to change an action that has 
already been done, or to take an action that the target would otherwise not take. These 
three intended effects fall into two categories of coercive threats, compellence and 
deterrence.12 The act of deterrence intends for the target not to act, while the act of 
compellence intends for the target to change an action or take an action it would 
otherwise not choose. Compellence, as defined by Schelling, is the type of coercion that 
is the focus of this thesis. Schelling elaborates on his description stating that coercion is 
“the very exploitation of enemy wants and fears.”13 This exploitation of “wants and 
fears” is the coercion that is central to our thesis. 
b. Indirect Warfare 
Liddell Hart’s theory of the indirect approach is based upon minimizing loss of 
life and resources by attacking an enemy along less likely avenues of approach. This 
theory was developed as a result of the trench warfare of WWI, which was the cause of 
tremendous loss of life and unnecessary protracted war. Liddell Hart states that the object 
of war is to attain a better peace. A better peace would certainly require maximizing the 
resources available to the state during the time of peace, therefore expending the least 
amount required in the conduct of war is critical to attaining the better peace. 
c. Political Warfare 
Political warfare has multiple, overlapping definitions. A common theme to all of 
the definitions is that political warfare does not involve a direct and immediate intent to 
                                                 
11 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “Coercion.” 
12 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 312; Patrick C. Bratton, “When is Coercion Successful? and Why 
Can’t We Agree on it?” Naval War College Review 58, no. 3 (2005): 99–100.  
13 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 312.  
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kill or engage an enemy’s military forces.14 Another common theme is that political 
warfare uses all the instruments of power with the intent to influence the will of an 
adversary. The most thorough definition comes from a U.S. National Security Council 
document published in 1948: 
Political warfare is a logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time 
of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all 
the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national 
objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from 
such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP), and 
“white” propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of 
“friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare and even 
encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.15 
ERP refers to the European Recovery Plan, which was a subset of the Marshall 
Plan. In this sense, inducements were conceptualized as an integral part of political 
warfare. Seabury and Codevilla explain it as “The essence of war is a contest of political 
wills. The goal is to get one’s adversary to conform with one’s political will.” They go on 
to say “The term ‘political warfare’...refers both to the whole of warfare directed at 
producing political results and to that part of warfare that employs political means to 
attain the political goals of war even without the actual engagement of fighting troops.”16 
Here we can see that coercion and political warfare are intertwined. Recently, Generals 
Odierno, Amos, and Admiral McRaven published a white paper in which they describe 
the “Human Nature of Conflict” as “Influencing these people—be they heads of state, 
tribal elders, militaries and their leaders or even an entire population—remains essential 
to securing U.S. interests. All elements of national power have an important role in these 
interactions with other nations and peoples.” They do not refer to it as political warfare, 
but they are clearly talking about the same effort to influence as expressed by Codevilla 
and Seabury and the National Security Council in 1948. The intent of this thesis is to 
                                                 
14 Paul A. Smith Jr., On Political War (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989), 
17.  
15 “Document 269–Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence 
Establishment–Historical Documents–Office of the Historian,” Accessed January 20, 2014,  
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945–50Intel/d269. .  
16 Angelo Codevilla and Paul Seabury, War: Ends and Means (New York: Basic Books, Inc. 
Publishers, 1989), 17, 160.  
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analyze the efforts of political warfare, using an indirect strategy as suggested by Liddell 
Hart. Thus, we shall refer to it as indirect coercion. 
d. Indirect Coercion 
Combining coercion, indirect strategy, and political warfare, we conceptualize 
indirect coercion as follows; using a surrogate element to persuade and influence the 
actions of a target government or other political entity by utilizing threats and actions to 
exploit fractures along the social, economic, and political seams of the target without 
employing conventional military means. Conventional warfare is open conflict between 
two or more states using conventional weapons and battlefield tactics. 
e. Key Actors 
Coercion conducted through a surrogate is the act of contracting a third party to 
influence the behavior of a target entity. The three key actors are the sponsor, the 
surrogate and the target. Kathleen M. Eisenhardt describes this contractual relationship in 
her paper “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review.” Specifically, she describes the 
agency relationship as one “in which one party (the principal) delegates work to another 
(the agent) who performs that work.”17 The roles compare to those of the indirect 
coercion model as follows: the principal correlates to the sponsor, the agent to the 
surrogate or third party entity, and the target remains the target. A layman’s example of 
the principal-agent relationship is that of a homeowner (principle) that wants to remodel a 
bathroom and the plumber (agent) hired to do the remodeling.18 An international relations 
example of the principal-agent relationship is that of the United States and the Afghan 
Mujahidin in 1980s.19 That relationship, although highly publicized in the last decade, 
required the highest classification and secrecy during its operational lifespan in order for 
the coercion to be effective. 
                                                 
17 Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 58.  
18 Leo Blanken, “DA 3882 Deterrence, Coercion, and Crisis Management” (Monterey, CA, Naval 
Postgraduate School, February 2013, 2013). 
19 Robert D. Kaplan, Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: 
Random House Inc., 1990), 235–278. 
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The sponsor and the surrogate may have different objectives or they may closely 
mirror one another. The objective of the sponsor is to influence the behavior of the target. 
The objective of the surrogate is not always exactly the same as the sponsor. Tibet and 
the United States in the 1950s and 1960s had a sponsor-surrogate relationship. The target 
in that case was China. The Tibetan objective was to end the Chinese occupation, while 
the U.S. objective was to move Chinese attention away from Korea and Taiwan.20 The 
interests in the sponsor-surrogate relationship are very important. The interests generate 
motivations, and strong motivations can have a direct effect on the success of the effort. 
Alexander L. George elaborated this idea in the following way, “The likelihood of 
successful coercion is greater if one side is more strongly motivated by what is at 
stake.”21  
4. Caveat 
The factors identified and analyzed in this thesis are a start point for research on 
the use of indirect coercion. This thesis is not intended to be the definitive work on this 
subject. Additionally, the conditions under which indirect coercion is not optimal are 
equally important to understanding its potential as a policy option. Identifying these 
conditions will assist decision makers to know when not to use indirect coercion. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will examine four historical cases of indirect coercion to explore the 
varying degrees of outcomes, from success to complete failure: Indonesia, Italy, and 
Chile during the early Cold War era; and Hezbollah as an ongoing case. Hezbollah and 
Italy are examples of high success, Chile having low success, and Indonesia being a 
complete failure. The understanding of the four factors of our analysis will assist in 
identifying the conditions under which indirect coercion can be most effective. 
                                                 
20 Ryan C. Agee and Maurice K. DuClos, “Why UW: Factoring in the Decion Point for 
Unconventional Warfare” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA), 49. 
21 Alexander L. George, David Kent Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits Of Coercive 
Diplomacy: Laos-Cuba-Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 218–219.  
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1. Hypothesis 
In order to answer the research question of: Under what conditions is coercion 
conducted indirectly successful, the four selected case studies will be formatted in three 
specific sections that identify: 1) the political challenges faced by decision makers, and  
2) the role that indirect coercion played in reaching a solution. First, the case studies will 
provide of a historical synopsis that will include the political situation and the strategic 
environment, the key players involved and identify the relationships between the sponsor, 
the surrogate and the target. Second, the cases will be examined through the lens of the 
hypothesis: Indirect coercion will be a more viable policy option for political and military 
decision makers if there is a better understanding of the conditions that can make indirect 
coercion successful; to identify the role of indirect coercion that was involved in the case 
and its overall utility based upon the given conditions within the environment.  
The previously stated hypothesis and four factors will be fused within the analysis 
portion of the case studies through the below supporting hypotheses:  
a. Supporting Hypothesis 1 
A deliberate process of identifying potential surrogates based on their population 
influence and goals increases the success of an indirect coercion campaign. 
We will test whether the selection of a surrogate that can exploit existing fractures 
in the political, social and economic fabric of the target state greatly enhances the 
probability of success. Additionally, the depth of a surrogate’s ability to influence the 
population can significantly strengthen or weaken the durability of success. Social 
movements within an adversarial nation often simply need the right support and direction 
to become a coercive force.22 This is exemplified by the selection of the Solidarity 
movement in Poland as a surrogate in the 1980s to undermine Soviet influence. The 
mutual goals of the West and the Solidarity movement to free the Polish government of 
communist influence made for an exceptionally successful partnership of two entities 
both seeking the same results. 
                                                 
22Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, eds., Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to 
Collective Action (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2003), 24.  
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b. Supporting Hypothesis 2  
A coercion campaign that is surrogate-centric, rather than sponsor-centric, is more 
likely to achieve the intended goals and less likely to be viewed as illegitimate in the 
target country. 
We will test whether the amount of goal convergence between the sponsor and the 
surrogate has a bearing on success. This will involve specific analysis focused on whether 
the campaign was primarily surrogate-centric or sponsor-centric, and what effect this has 
on success or failure. We believe that a sponsor benefits from understanding and enabling 
the surrogate’s goals and desired outcome. Developing a strategy to provide incentives 
based on the common desired outcome throughout the duration of the campaign will 
result in long-term success for the surrogate and the sponsor. Additionally, there may be a 
need to compromise on desired outcomes to maintain alignment. In other words, the 
relationship may require modification to other goals. 
c. Supporting Hypothesis 3 
A successful campaign of indirect coercion can be either covert or overt in nature. 
We intend to assess whether success is dependent on a coercion campaign being 
executed in a covert or overt manner. Based on the strategic requirements, operations 
may be initially carried out as overt, clandestine, or covert, or any combination of the 
three. Changes in the environment may change the requirements of the covert or overt 
nature of the campaign. Codevilla and Seabury state this concept in the following 
manner; “All arms of political war involve subversion in one sense or another, with the 
choice of degree of openness or clandestinity depending on the tactical requirements of 
the situation. It is important to remember that clandestinity is a mode of political war, not 
its defining characteristic.”23 Generally, the sponsor enters into the contractual 
relationship with the surrogate because the potential 2nd and 3rd order effects of direct 
coercion are undesirable to the sponsor.  
                                                 
23Codevilla and Seabury, War: Ends and Means, 4.  
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d. Supporting Hypothesis 4 
Positive inducements as a supplement to coercion can increase the effect of 
indirect coercion in political warfare based on analysis of target vulnerabilities. 
Last, this thesis will examine the effect of inducements on coercion campaigns. 
The hypothesis is that the target state may be more likely to conform to the political will 
of the sponsor if target requirements are analyzed and positive inducements (carrots) 
offered as a compliment to the indirect coercion (sticks). The positive inducements can 
take many forms, such as; economic aid, military cooperation, trade agreements, 
amnesty, etc. Conversely, a continued use of force by the surrogate to disrupt target state 
operations is an example of negative inducements. Additionally, negative inducements 
imposed upon an adversarial regime may not produce the initially desired goal to cease a 
specific behavior or action. Negative inducements can further entrench an adversarial 
regime and create a “rally around the flag” effect that can strengthen popular support by 
legitimizing the adversaries’ narrative.24 According to Andrew J. Birtle, “the great 
challenge is to find the right blend (of carrots and sticks) for a particular situation.”25 
Birtle makes the case that situations may require that negative inducements (sticks) 
precede the positive (carrots) based on intended goals. Lastly, the cases will be analyzed 
through the four identified factors derived from the supporting hypotheses 1) Surrogate 
targeting, 2) Surrogate versus sponsor centricity, 3) Overt/covert balance, and 4) Positive 
inducements as a supplement to coercive measures and their effectiveness. 
2. Case Selection  
The four cases that will be presented were selected from the below table depicting 
historical examples coercion campaigns. Table 1 provides the cases that were of potential 
use and could best provide the spectrum of analytical possibilities to effectively provide 
the answer to the proposed research question. 
                                                 
24 Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Musʻab Al-Suri 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 27.  
25 Andrew J. Birtle, “Persuasion and Coercion in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Much Confusion 
Remains Over the Roles that Persuasion and Coercion Play in Rebellions and Other Internal Conflicts. 
what is the Relationship between Force and Politics?” Military Review 88, no. 4 (2008): 45.  
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politics and relations 





Surrogate Stand Alone High 







Surrogate Stand Alone Low 
U.S. & D. 
Republic 1963 







Surrogate  Nested  Medium 
U.S. & China 
(Tibet) 1956 
Coerce Chinese 
Government CIA Surrogate Nested High 
U.S. & Laos 1957 Coerce Pathet Lao to discontinue communism CIA/USSF Surrogate Nested Low 
U.S. & 
Indonesia 1955 
Coerce Sukarno out of 
Neutrality CIA Sponsor 
Stand 
Alone Failed 
U.S. & Soviet 
Union 
(Afghanistan) 
1979 Coerce USSR to end Afghan Occupation CIA Surrogate Nested High 
U.S. & 
China(Burma) 1950 
Support to KMT against 
PRC CIA Sponsor Nested Low 
U.S. & Italy 1948 
Support Democratic 
Political Parties against 
Communist/Socialist 
Parties 
CIA Surrogate Nested High 
U.S. & Chile 1964 
Support election of 
Eduardo Frei (Christian 
Democratic Party 
Leader)/ Block election 
of Marxist candidate 
Salvador Allende 
CIA Surrogate(1964) Sponsor (1970) Nested Low 
 
The cases of Indonesia, Chile, Italy, and Hezbollah were selected from the cases 
depicted in the Table 1 to demonstrate both the failure and success of coercion 
campaigns. The Indonesia case was selected as the example of the complete failure of a 
coercion campaign. The inability of the U.S. to coerce the Indonesian government out of 
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neutrality during the early years of the Cold War will be examined to identify the reason 
for this failure. The case of Chile was selected to provide an example of how a coercion 
campaign achieved success in the early 1960s, but inevitably resulted in failure by 1970. 
U.S. efforts to support the Christian Democratic Party resulted in a favorable outcome in 
the 1964 Chilean presidential election; however, U.S. efforts were unsuccessful in 
attempting to prevent the election of a Marxist leaning candidate in 1970.  
The case of Hezbollah provides an example of how Iran influenced political 
objectives in the Middle East through a proxy group. Since the 1980s, Iran has achieved 
success in utilizing Hezbollah as an instrument to carry out coercion campaigns in 
Lebanon and Israel and continues to do so. Also highlighting a successful coercion 
campaign is the case of U.S. involvement in Italy following the end of World War II. The 
case of Italy in the late 1940s demonstrates a successful coercion campaign carried out by 
the newly formed CIA to prevent the Soviet backed Italian Communist and Socialist 
Parties from taking power in early days of the Cold War. 
F. ORGANIZATION AND CHAPTER OVERVIEW  
Chapters II, III, IV, and V will consist of the individual case studies (Indonesia, 
Chile, Hezbollah, and Italy) that will provide examples ranging on the spectrum from 
complete failure to success in a coercion campaign. These four chapters will contain a 
historical synopsis of the respective case then an analysis section that will be subdivided 
into the targeting of third party surrogates, covert/overt balance, surrogate/sponsor 
centricity, and inducements. The analysis will provide the evidence to identify the level 
of success associated with the individual case studies pertaining to the ability of the U.S. 
to conduct indirect coercion. Chapter VII will be comprised of the findings and 
conclusion. The findings from the research of the individual case studies will be used to 
identify any political, military, social, and economic variables that set the underlying 
conditions for a successful coercion campaign. Additionally, Chapter VII will identify 
when indirect coercion can be effectively applied to support U.S. goals and interests. 
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II. INDONESIA CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1950s, the U.S. government, from President Eisenhower on down, was 
engulfed in an effort to reduce the influence of communism throughout Asia. Losses in 
this effort had already been seen in China, and the struggle was ongoing in Korea until 
1953. The struggle against communism in Asia was looking bleak with communist 
influence now emerging in multiple Southeast Asian states, like Malaysia and Vietnam. 
In response to the growing threat of communism, “Eisenhower and Dulles…developed a 
foreign policy that equated Third World non-alignment with evil.”26  
B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The newly independent nation of Indonesia saw a growing communist influence 
in the form of the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party. The PKI was gaining 
appointments within the cabinet of the Indonesian President, Sukarno. Sukarno had 
declared neutrality in the Cold War between the U.S. and the USSR, but these 
appointments were being interpreted by the Dulles brothers as indicative of communist 
influence and growing power in the Sukarno government. 
1. Sponsor Situation 
A U.S. policy was developed to influence the Sukarno government into 
abandoning neutrality and reducing communist influence within the fledgling 
government.27 The Eisenhower administration implemented this policy using a “two-
track” methodology; the official diplomatic route through the embassy in Jakarta, and the 
covert route through rebel groups on the outer islands.28 The “two-track” methodology 
                                                 
26 David P. Forsythe, “Democracy, War, and Covert Action,” Journal of Peace Research 29, no. 4 
(November 1992, 1992): 388.  
27 Douglas Blake Kennedy, “Operation HAIK: The Eisenhower Administration and the Central 
Intelligence Agency in Indonesia, 1957–1958” (master’s thesis, University of Georgia), 6. 
28 Audrey R. Kahin and George McT Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower 
and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: The New Press, 1995): 93; Kenneth Conboy and James 
Morrison, Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia, 1957–1958 (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1999): 16.  
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was based on the 3 September 1957 Special Report on Indonesia paragraph 4 
subparagraph c, which states: 
To continue the present pattern of our formal relationships with Indonesia, 
but so to adjust our programs and activities as to give greater emphasis to 
support of the anticommunist forces in the outer islands while at the same 
time continuing attempts to produce effective action on the part of the 
non- and anticommunist forces on Java.29 
The Eisenhower administration knew that Sukarno was not a communist, but a 
neutralist, and they did want to reduce the influence of the PKI.30 According to a phone 
conversation between the Dulles brothers on February 21, 1958, the Secretary of State 
supported “doing something, but it is difficult to figure out what or why. … If you get 
involved in a civil war he is not sure what kind of case you have…wants to help the 
people.”31 
The Dulles brothers, John Foster and Allen W., were the Secretary of State and 
the director of the CIA, respectively, during the time of this policy. The CIA had been 
recently created from what had been the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World 
War II. The fledgling agency had taken the charter of the OSS to support resistance 
movements and applied it to the emerging global conflict with communism.32 The CIA 
had experienced recent successes using covert support to surrogate forces in both Iran 
and Guatemala.33 With President Eisenhower’s approval, the two brothers began planning 
for covert actions to be conducted in Indonesia, under the name Operation HAIK. 
There were several elements in the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta that engaged with the 
State Department, Pentagon, and indirectly the CIA. Two of the key individuals were 
                                                 
29 “Document 262–Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume 
XXII–Historical Documents–Office of the Historian,” accessed January 8, 2014, 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955–57v22/d262.  
30 Brands, The Limits of Manipulation: How the United States Didn’t Topple Sukarno, 790.  
31 “Office of the Historian –Historical Documents–Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, 
Indonesia, Volume XVII –Document 22,” accessed November 16, 2013, 
http://www.history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958–60v17/d22.   
32 Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia, 1957–
1958 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 15.  
33 John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1987), 268.  
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Ambassador Howard P. Jones and Assistant Military Attaché Colonel George Benson. 
Ambassador Jones had extensive experience in Indonesia and Colonel Benson was 
developing significant relationships with the senior leadership of the Indonesian military. 
2. Target Situation 
In 1949, Indonesia was granted independence from the Netherlands. The new 
nation was caught between the internal regional struggles that accompany newly granted 
independence and the external ideological struggles that emerged following the end of 
World War II. The Indonesian President elected in 1955, Sukarno, was a charismatic, if 
not totally eccentric, individual who was able to overcome the diversity of Indonesia and 
rally the population to the call of independence.34 The ability to rally the diverse 
Indonesian population was critical to establishing a central government. Adrian Vickers 
writes “Sukarno’s great gift was that he could speak directly to the hearts of the 
people.”35 Domestically, one great challenge was being able to achieve consensus among 
the various political factions. In addition to Sukarno’s own nationalist party, there were 
also the communist party or PKI and a major Islamic political party called Masayumi. 
Furthermore, the military itself was a great political force in Indonesia since the fight for 
independence. Another major factor in creating a central government for Indonesia was 
allowing some amount of autonomy in the outer islands, specifically to the military 
leaders in those areas.  
Two of the primary internal and external political concerns of the Sukarno 
government were pushing its claim for West New Guinea in the UN and establishing a 
strong national military. The Dutch had retained control of West New Guinea after losing 
the war for the greater Indonesia in 1949, and since that time Indonesia had been fighting, 
politically, for sovereignty over West New Guinea. This was one issue on which the 
entirety of the Indonesian leadership agreed, largely because it was at the core of the 
Indonesian nationalism that had won them independence from the Dutch in the first 
                                                 
34 H. W. Brands, “The Limits of Manipulation: How the United States Didn’t Topple Sukarno,” The 
Journal of American History 76, no. 3 (December, 1983, 1989): 789.  
35 Adrian Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 115.  
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place.36 The issue of the military was not one of size, but lack of modern weaponry and 
training. The post-revolutionary Indonesian military was nearly half a million strong, but 
had inconsistent training from both the Dutch and Japanese and lacked weapons, vehicles 
and the requisite repair parts for both. 
By late 1957, Sukarno had implemented a policy of rotating military leaders 
between the previously autonomous regions. These military leaders would be selected by 
the central government in Jakarta. This was an initiative to neutralize local autonomy 
from the outer islands and centralize power in Jakarta. This policy was supported by the 
Army Chief of Staff, General Nasution. Harold Crouch clarifies the thin line between the 
Indonesian military and civilian leadership in Indonesian politics. He states that the 
Indonesian Army in 1949 “formally accepted the principle of civilian supremacy, and its 
officers assumed a role on the edge of political life.”37 After the successful revolution 
against Dutch imperialism, the Indonesian Army consisted of nearly 500,000 soldiers, 
both regular and irregular who were either trained by the Japanese during WWII or the 
Dutch Army during its imperial rule. In 1950, Army Chief of Staff Colonel Abdul Haris 
Nasution attempted to implement a plan to provide structure to the massive military force 
and cut its active numbers down from a half million to 57,000 troops. The commanders 
of these militias and other units were held in great esteem in their local areas and could 
sway the population’s support. Kahin and Kahin state that “A significant proportion of 
the Japanese-trained and indoctrinated group (of officers) felt that the army should have a 
major voice in politics.”38  
3. Surrogate Situation 
The significant reduction in military personnel created unrest within the ranks 
from top to bottom, and reduced outer island autonomy. These issues incited several 
active duty colonels to rebel against the central government in Jakarta with the intent of 
                                                 
36 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in 
Indonesia, 45.  
37 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Revised ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1978), 24.  
38 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in 
Indonesia, 46.  
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wresting back regional power from the central government. These colonels also gained 
support from a large number of militias that were disgruntled after contributing to the 
revolution and then being excluded from the establishment of the TNI (the Indonesian 
National Army). The two significant rebellions were Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam 
(Permesta) and the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI), led by colonels 
Sumual and Simbolon, respectively.  
The leadership of both Permesta and the PRRI held anticommunist sentiment, but 
this sentiment was not common to the populations that the groups represented. The 
planners at the CIA determined to use these two resistance movements in their effort to 
coerce the Sukarno government, and in January 1958 inserted an agency officer and a 
radioman to act as a direct liaison to the rebels in Sumatra.39  
The island of Sumatra is of strategic importance to Indonesia, as it sits along the 
Malacca Strait, which borders both Malaysia and Singapore. Therefore, Sumatran leaders 
had leverage in maintaining some autonomy while the government hub was located in 
Jakarta. After the Dutch colonialists left, the Tentara National Indonesia (TNI) national 
military was created and Sumatra was separated into two military regions. The northern 
and southern regions were headquartered at Medan and Palembang, respectively. Sumatra 
is ethnically complex. The major ethnicities represented are the Achenese, Batak, 
Javanese, Malay, and Chinese. The Batak are the largest group in East Sumatra where the 
main city of Medan is located. The Batak are primarily Muslim with a minority of 
Christians to the north.40  
On 2 March 1957, Permesta was formed by Lieutenant Colonel Sumual and his 
senior military staff on Sulawesi in the southern city of Makassar. Sumual was widely 
respected and considered an intellectual rising power in the Indonesian Army. He also 
believed in greater regional autonomy for Indonesia, both politically and economically. 
Permesta issued a declaration to the central government in Jakarta demanding more 
military, economic and political autonomy, and emphasized that their intent was not to 
                                                 
39 Ibid.  
40 John R. W. Smail, “The Military Politics of North Sumatra December 1956–October 1957,” 
Indonesia, no. 6 (October 1968, 1968): 132.  
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separate from the Indonesian state. Not only is the physical distance from Jakarta an issue 
for Sulawesi, but the population of Sulawesi had developed a good relationship with the 
European colonialists and were not as active in supporting the war for independence a 
decade earlier as was other parts of the archipelago. 41 Due to the strategic importance of 
Sumatra, the rebels on Sulawesi gained significance after aligning themselves with 
Colonel Simbolon and the PRRI. 
On 16 December 1956, Permesta and the PRRI together signed a petition against 
the government in Jakarta. Sumual’s movement, Permesta, was also consolidated under 
the PRRI without his consent while he was in Manila conducting meetings with the CIA. 
The dissatisfaction of these military officers was threefold. First, was the personal 
relations and politics within the Indonesian Army officers. Second, dissatisfaction 
stemmed from the reduction in military troop strength and budget. The officers in both 
Sumatra and Sulawesi had turned to smuggling copra and rubber, respectively, in order to 
maintain their units. Finally, was the perception of ethnic consolidation of power by the 
Sukarno government. 
The PRRI was led by Colonel Maludin Simbolon, a highly respected military 
leader and diplomat, who at the time was the territorial commander of North Sumatra. He 
had become well known for his military leadership during the revolution and his 
diplomatic skill after the revolution in negotiations with the Dutch as well as dealing with 
the growing foreign diplomatic representation in the northern city of Medan. He was also 
well known and respected for his public opposition to the Sukarno government and its 
policies regarding usurping of power from the regional commanders. Following the 
Indonesian elections of 1955 Colonel Simbolon was a candidate to challenge Colonel 
Nasution for the position of army chief of staff.42 Colonel Simbolon was a Batak 
Christian, which did create some challenges for him representing the largely Muslim 
population of Sumatra. In Sumatra, there was an increased amount of discontent with the 
Jakarta government after the resignation of Vice President Hatta, an Acehnese Muslim 
who supported greater regional autonomy. This, in conjunction with the new policy of 
                                                 
41 Conboy and Morrison, Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia, 1957–1958, 10.  
42 Smail, The Military Politics of North Sumatra December 1956–October 1957, 133.  
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rotating military commanders sent from Jakarta, was enough to create serious public 
support for the dissident military officers. On 22 December 1956, Colonel Simbolon 
“announced he was no longer taking orders from the central government.”43  
The rebels initially attempted to buy weapons on their own from multiple nations, 
with limited success. Once the CIA joined their cause, they found multiple countries 
willing sell weapons to them from Taiwan to England. The Philippines also became 
involved in supporting the rebels with both equipment and personnel. The CIA provided 
aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons to the rebels in an attempt to replicate the elements of 
success experienced in Guatemala earlier in the decade.44 Those successes included a 
covert air capability that was entirely supplied, supported and manned by the agency. In 
Indonesia, the effort included acquiring airfields that would support the P-51 Mustangs 
and the B-26 bombers. The pilots would come from both the U.S. and the Philippines.  
The growing rebellion quickly gained attention in Jakarta. In February 1958, the 
rebellious Colonels gave Jakarta an ultimatum to return a certain amount of autonomy to 
the regions or they would seek independence. Unfortunately this ultimatum was made 
without the consent of Lieutenant Colonel Sumual who was in Hong Kong at the time 
and was unaware that an ultimatum was being made on his behalf.  
Jakarta received the ultimatum and allowed the date to pass without a response. 
Sukarno instructed his chief of the Army, Colonel Nasution, to make preparations for the 
Indonesian Army to subdue the rebellion. The Indonesian military initiated operations to 
retake the contested areas of Sumatra with Naval landing crafts and several battalions of 
soldiers. These efforts were supported by the Indonesian Air Force, with bombing raids 
on the rebel airfields and aircraft conducting search and destroy missions against rebel 
aircraft. On 18 May 1956, a CIA pilot was shot down by Indonesian forces and captured 
with documentation identifying him as a CIA contractor.45 Subsequently, the rebellion 
was severely diminished, which led the CIA to cease its support to the rebels. 
                                                 
43 Conboy and Morrison, Feet to the Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia, 1957–1958, 7.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid.; Kahin and Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle 
in Indonesia.  
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Back in Washington, Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers began deliberations 
about the future of the covert operations. Secretary of State Dulles determined that the 
only option was to abandon support for the rebels and support the anticommunist 
elements within the Indonesian government. Allen Dulles, director of the CIA, had to 
deal with the fallout of one of his people being detained in a foreign country and the 
domestic and international scrutiny that was sure to follow.46  
C. ANALYSIS 
Below, we will provide an initial analysis of this case through the lens of our main 
hypothesis. Following that we will examine this case based upon the four supporting 
hypotheses. 
1. Through the Lens of the Hypotheses 
The following analysis examines the Indonesian case study through the thesis 
hypothesis that is: Indirect coercion will be a more viable policy option for political and 
military decision makers if there is a better understanding of the conditions that can make 
indirect coercion successful. There were several key issues that affected U.S. priorities 
and objectives pertaining to relations with Indonesia prior to late 1957. The first was 
encouraging and supporting the emergence of Indonesia as a democratic nation in 
Southeast Asia. The second was to maintain good economic relations with Indonesia due 
to the oil and rubber resources that Indonesia controls, which would be critical resources 
in the event of another global or regional war. The third was to remain neutral in the 
negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia with respect to Indonesia’s claim to 
West New Guinea, while exploring potential solutions that would satisfy all parties. The 
primary objective of the U.S. government in 1955, according to NSC document 5518, 
with respect to Indonesia was “to prevent Indonesia from passing into the Communist 
orbit…and to assist Indonesia to develop a stable, free government with the will and 
                                                 
46 Ibid.  
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ability to resist communism within and without.”47 The stated objectives do not suggest 
that promoting democracy was a priority; the only priority was to ensure that Indonesia 
did not become communist or become significantly influenced by internal communist 
elements. This priority does not change throughout 1957; the only change is the intensity 
with which the recommended courses of action are addressed in the official 
communications.  
In this case, indirect coercion was the chosen policy option. The resulting 
operations ultimately failed due to poor surrogate analysis, inadequate use of 
inducements, and exposure of covert operations. The following sections will analyze the 
case through each of the sub-hypotheses. 
2. Supporting Hypothesis 1 
The efforts by the CIA to target a surrogate to assist in achieving U.S. goals and 
priorities were significantly hampered by unclear goals as well as unclear preferred 
courses of action to achieve the goals established by the Eisenhower administration. The 
understood goals were to influence the Sukarno government to abandon its neutrality 
policy and to reduce the influence of the PKI on the government. Additionally, the 
surrogate targeting was ineffective due to a predetermined strategy developed at the 
executive level and lack of attention paid to the U.S. elements located at the U.S.  
embassy in Jakarta with access to the most credible information about the situation 
there.48 The single biggest impediment to achieving the desired goals was that the U.S. 
targeted a surrogate that did not share the same or even similar goals. The rebel colonels 
that led Permesta and the PRRI were anticommunist, but so were the leaders of the 
Indonesian Army in Jakarta.49 The goal of the rebels was to coerce the Sukarno 
                                                 
47 “Document 95–Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII–
Historical Documents–Office of the Historian,”  Accessed January 6, 2014, 
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48 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in 
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government to restore political and economic autonomy to the outer-island regions of 
Indonesia. 
NSC document 5518 clearly states that the objective of U.S. relations with 
Indonesia was “to assist Indonesia to develop a stable, free government with the will and 
ability to resist Communism from within and without.” This goal from the 1955 
document is not changed significantly by the 1957 document, which states “continue the 
present pattern of our formal relationships…but so to adjust…to give greater emphasis to 
support of the anticommunist forces in the outer islands.”50 The support provided to the 
rebels does not coincide with developing a stable government, on the contrary that 
support is very specifically given in order to destabilize the government. 
U.S. elements working in the Embassy in Jakarta were not in favor of supporting 
the rebels as a method to reduce communist influence. Colonel George Benson was an 
assistant to the Military Attaché in the embassy in Jakarta from 1956 to 1959. During this 
time he had developed strong relationships with the leadership of the Indonesian Army, 
specifically Generals Nasution and Yani. Colonel Benson’s reports to Washington stated 
that “the rebellion was not one of non-Communist versus Communist forces, but rather a 
split within the non-Communist faction in Indonesia.”51 In his book about Indonesia, 
Ambassador Jones relates a conversation he had with Vice President Hatta about the 
rebels. 
Then what has happened in Indonesia is that the anticommunist army 
leadership has been split. Anticommunists are fighting anticommunists. 
Communism is not the major issue of this dispute. 
“Exactly,” Hatta replied.52 
The ambassador later states “Washington policy makers had not been privy to all 
the facts…but had proceeded on the assumption that communism was the main issue.”53 
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These examples indicate a disconnect between the actions taken to achieve U.S. goals 
and the information coming from U.S. sources closest to the situation. 
The CIA focused on achieving something in a short period of time as a higher 
priority than achieving the desired goal, which would have taken more time. Therefore, 
the CIA partnered with the rebels that were ready, although they did not share the same 
goals as the U.S. government. The vast ethnic, and to a lesser extent religious, diversity 
of Indonesia created a very difficult problem for determining a suitable surrogate. There 
were clear divisions within and between the two groups, Permesta and PRRI. The initial 
geographic differences are clear, they were located on two large islands separated by the 
island of Java. Then, you have the ideological differences between the two regions, 
Sumatra having been crucial to supporting the revolution and Sulawesi having been more 
supportive of the Dutch colonialists. Within the groups, there were ethnic and religious 
divisions as well. Permesta was being led by a Batak Christian, while the majority of his 
constituency was Muslim. In a country as diverse as Indonesia, it would be almost 
impossible to find a surrogate that was representative of a majority of the nation, but the 
research did not produce evidence suggesting that analysis was done to determine the 
suitability of this particular surrogate to achieve U.S. strategic goals.  
Conboy and Morrison, in discussing the divisions within the rebel elements, state 
they “were showing themselves more interested in protecting their respective home turfs 
than forging a united PRRI campaign.”54 This suggests that there were fractures in the 
rebel elements that were not being considered by the CIA in their preparation. 
Understanding these fractures and the motivations of all elements involved could have 
led to an improved understanding of leverage points to achieve U.S. goals without risking 
embarrassment. 
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3. Supporting Hypothesis 2  
U.S. efforts to maintain either a covert or overt nature to these operations are 
unclear. The U.S. interest in the political outcome in Indonesia was quite visible 
immediately following the conclusion of WWII, as our tanks and uniforms were being 
used by Dutch troops responding to the revolution and quickly identified by the 
Indonesians. This overt support to the Dutch in their efforts to maintain colonial control 
of the archipelago did not sit well with the Indonesians, and may have been the beginning 
of anti-American sentiment. 55  
Several years later, the efforts to support the rebel groups in Indonesia were 
handled covertly. Specifically, the acquisition and transfer of supplies to Permesta were 
conducted covertly. However, the number of countries that were involved in the effort 
suggests limited interest in keeping the support a secret. Those countries included 
Taiwan, Philippines, England and Italy. Additionally, having American and Filipino 
pilots flying U.S. supplied aircraft displayed a clear lack of intent to maintain a true 
covert mission. Ambassador Jones relates a conversation he had with Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Sunbandrio on 15 March 1958, in which the Foreign Minister subtly suggests 
that the rebels are being supplied by the U.S. but never states it outright.56 The purposeful 
exposure of a covert mission may be intended to alert the target state to the amount of 
support the surrogate is receiving in order to influence a desired response, although in the 
case of Indonesia the exposure of the operations gave the target state leverage in 
unrelated negotiations.  
4. Supporting Hypothesis 3 
As stated earlier, the goals of both Permesta and the PRRI were not to overthrow 
the central government in Jakarta; they were merely to influence Sukarno to reverse his 
policy on rotating regional commanders. Overthrow of the Sukarno regime was never a 
stated goal of the Eisenhower administration either. But the heavy handed military 
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campaign pursued by the CIA through the rebel factions on the outer islands in Indonesia 
seemed to reflect overthrow as an underlying intent. Lacking clear goals on the part of the 
sponsor made it nearly impossible to determine if the surrogate elements being analyzed 
were within an acceptable amount of goal divergence. The goals of the two resistance 
groups, Permesta and PRRI, were primarily greater military, political and economic 
autonomy from the government in Jakarta, and not to separate from or to revolt against 
the existing power structure. They simply wanted greater autonomy for the outer islands 
of the archipelago as had existed since the independence granted in 1949. The groups 
were also plagued by unclear goals. One of the leading personalities in Permesta, 
Lieutenant Colonel Sumual, had “professed continued loyalty to the TNI hierarchy” 
while at the same time supporting the declaration for autonomy from Jakarta.57 The 
leadership of both Permesta and the PRRI were known to be anticommunist and indicated 
they wanted to reduce the influence of the PKI on the decisions in Jakarta, but this 
sentiment does not seem to be reflected in the populations that they represented on 
Sumatra and Sulawesi. 
In July of 1957, the PKI won many local elections, increasing their political 
presence not only in Java, but also on Sumatra and Sulawesi.58 This potential schism 
between the leadership of the rebellions and the support base would have been a concern 
if thorough analysis had been done. Additionally, the Sukarno government had 
previously displayed its ability to resist the communist efforts in Indonesia when his 
government crushed the Madiun rebellion, a communist uprising on Java in November 
1948.59 Clearly, there was a disconnect between the apparent goals of the Eisenhower 
administration and the CIA efforts in Indonesia. This resulted in a poor analysis of the 
potential surrogate elements that would be best suited to assist. Some amount of 
convergence of stated goals must be present for the success of a partnership between a 
sponsor and surrogate. In this situation, the CIA undertook the endeavor without clearly 
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identifying its goals and doing a proper assessment of the surrogate it eventually 
employed. Therefore, Operation HAIK was sponsor-centric, because the goals of the U.S. 
were primary over those of the surrogate. 
5. Supporting Hypothesis 4 
Inducements in this case can be divided into two categories. Those inducements 
offered to the Indonesian government and those offered to the rebels. The U.S. continued 
to attempt to induce Sukarno and the Indonesian government with offers of economic aid 
and support through the embassy in Jakarta. Conversely, the CIA induced the Indonesian 
rebels to take action against the government by providing money, military equipment and 
personnel. 
This “two-track” approach was by design of the policy makers in Washington, 
DC. The U.S. was continuing to provide the Sukarno government economic support 
through the U.S. embassy in Jakarta, which amounted to “$11 million in technical 
assistance, malaria control and police training.”60 Given that the issue of sovereignty over 
West New Guinea was the one issue that united all the political elements in Indonesia, 
$11 million to control malaria seems rather minor and inconsequential as an inducement 
for reducing the influence of the PKI. In his telegram to the Ambassador, Secretary 
Dulles refers to the $11 million as “hardly a lever of major consequence.”61 
6. Conclusions 
There are significant portions of the official documentation that are still classified. 
Evidence of clear strategic goals may be included in the still classified documentation. 
Some errors, specifically surrogate targeting, may have been foreseeable due to the fact 
that the CIA had taken on the charter of the OSS, and that partnering with the French 
Resistance was an obvious surrogate and required little, if any, analysis. In this case of 
coercion, the desired response was for Sukarno to abandon neutrality and decrease 
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communist influence. In terms of the balance of covert to overt operations, achieving the 
objective would not have been affected by Sukarno, or the international community, 
knowing that Permesta/PRRI was receiving support from the U.S. It would have been 
more beneficial for the CIA support to the rebellion to have remained truly covert if 
possible. The benefit of remaining covert would have been denying the Sukarno 
government the knowledge that both the external and internal pressures were coming 
from the same place. If the Eisenhower administration intended to use inducements as a 
source of leverage over the Sukarno government, it should have seriously considered the 
two issues most important to the Indonesians; their claim for West New Guinea, training 
and materiel support for the Indonesian military. In December 1958, Sukarno himself 
questioned Secretary of State Dulles about the administration decrying Indonesia’s policy 
of neutrality in world affairs while simultaneously maintaining a position of neutrality on 
the West New Guinea issue.62 Professor Zachary Shore suggests John Foster Dulles 
suffered from the cognition trap of “Flatview,” which is an inability to recognize all the 
dimensions of an adversary’s situation while crafting a strategy.63 Shore was analyzing 
Operation AJAX, but his analysis applies to Operation HAIK equally well.  
Finally, President Kennedy had the operations reviewed by a Board of 
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence in 1961. Their summary analysis of Operation HAIK 
was extremely negative. Their analysis of the goals and planning concluded by stating the 
operation had “no proper estimate of aims nor proper prior planning on the part of 
anyone, and in its active phases the operation was directed, not by the DCI, but 
personally by the Secretary of State, who, ten thousand miles away…undertook to make 
practically all decisions down to…tactical military decisions.”64 The Eisenhower 
administration, specifically the Dulles brothers, may have neglected to fully analyze all 
the potential means at their disposal to achieve the ends desired in Indonesia. 
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III. CHILEAN CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The alignment of Cuba to the communist camp in the early 1960s and the ensuing 
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 solidified that the Western Hemisphere was a crucial 
battleground of the Cold War. In keeping with the strategies to avoid the Cold War from 
becoming “hot,” the use of proxy wars and covert action became the primary tactics in 
the clash between the capitalist and communist camps to gain global supremacy. The 
United States used the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as the tool to conduct global 
covert action and political warfare.65  
This chapter will examine the covert action programs utilized by the CIA in the 
early 1960s through the early 1970s and why the programs failed to deliver the desired 
end state designed to benefit the U.S. To gain a better understanding of how indirect 
coercion did not achieve the desired outcome in Chile, this chapter will first provide a 
historical overview of the covert action plans of the 1960s and early 1970s; then provide 
an analysis of the third party surrogates that were used by the U.S., the covert/overt 
balance of operations in Chile, the surrogate or sponsor-centric nature of the campaign, 
and the inducements that were used in the attempt to reach U.S. aims. 
B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The case study of Chile provides an example of the success and failure of covert 
action and indirect coercion spanning the Kennedy and Nixon administrations. CIA 
operations in Chile display success and high strategic utility accomplished through covert 
non-kinetic action that ensured the election of a pro-democratic government; however, a 
lack of persistent engagement and long-term initiatives later resulted in the election of a 
socialist leader aligned with Fidel Castro and the Soviet Union.  
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1. Early Years of Covert Action Success 
As early CIA covert action took place in Western Europe to counter communist 
uprisings in the years following World War II, the next decade would see Cold War battle 
lines encroaching on the Western Hemisphere. This encroachment was realized in 1959 
when the Cuban Revolution resulted in a Soviet aligned socialist government led by Fidel 
Castro less than 100 miles from the United States. Following the loss of Cuba to the 
Soviet camp, the United States increased its efforts in the early 1960s to ensure left 
leaning political parties with socialist aims did not come to power in Latin America.  
U.S. initiatives to deter communist expansion to Chile began under the presidency 
of John F. Kennedy. In 1962, President Kennedy authorized a covert political operation 
with the aim to influence the outcome of the upcoming 1964 Chilean election.66 The aim 
of the covert actions, to be carried out by the CIA, was to ensure that Eduardo Frei, the 
pro-democratic Christian Democratic Party candidate, was put into office. President 
Kennedy and other officials within his administration considered Eduardo Frei a 
moderate liberal who would best serve U.S. interests in the region and achieve reforms in 
Chile without violent revolutions.67 Most importantly, Eduardo Frei was a political 
opponent of the left leaning Salvador Allende who was a self-proclaimed Marxist with a 
communist following. If elected, the aims of Salvador Allende were to nationalize major 
industry, redistribute income through tax and land reform, and foster friendly ties with 
Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.68  
With the possibility of Chile falling to communism and aligning with the Soviets, 
the situation was dire for the U.S. In his book, Political Warfare and Psychological 
Operations, Carnes Lord offers a definition of political warfare provided by political 
scientist Angelo Codevilla as “the marshaling of human support, or opposition, in order 
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to achieve victory in war or in un-bloody conflicts as serious as war.”69 The use of 
political warfare would be the driving strategy behind U.S. efforts in Chile. The CIA 
would serve a dual role in Eduardo Frei’s presidency. The first role the CIA would play 
would be the channeling of funds to the Christian Democratic Party to assist in election 
campaigns for Eduardo Frei. The second role the CIA would play would be to carry out a 
large-scale anticommunist propaganda campaign aimed against Marxist rival Salvador 
Allende. The CIA accomplished its aims of covert action through identifying and 
building relationships within the Christian Democrat Party and western friendly media 
outlets to spread pro-democratic messages to the populace.70  
Following the assassination of President Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
continued support for Eduardo Frei and the Christian Democrat Party, and the continued 
use of covert political operations.71 The covert operations conducted under the Johnson 
administration during the 1964 campaign of Eduardo Frei consisted of financial support 
to the campaign and a massive anticommunist propaganda campaign. CIA financial 
support to the Christian Democratic Party encompassed more than half of the total cost of 
the campaign. Monetary support to the campaign was channeled through intermediaries 
such as the Chilean Radical Party and private citizens groups, who in turn passed the 
funds to the Christian Democratic Party to mask U.S. covert support to Eduardo Frei.72 
The massive anticommunist propaganda campaign consisted of the extensive use of the 
press, radio, film, pamphlets, poster, leaflets, direct mailings, and wall paintings. 
Propaganda messaging consisted of Soviet tanks and Cuban firing squads. In addition to 
portraying images of communist repression, thousands of copies of the anticommunist 
pastoral letter of Pope Pius XI were distributed.73  
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To the satisfaction of the United States, Eduardo Frei would go on to win the 
1964 Chilean presidential elections, preside over a pro-democratic government in Chile, 
and deny Fidel Castro and the Soviet Bloc an ally. To achieve this success, the U.S. 
Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
cooperated with the CIA to funnel up to $20 million dollars into Chile. Additionally, 
from 1964–1969, the CIA spent approximately $2 million dollars on 12 different covert 
actions projects to strengthen the Christian Democrat Party.74 The covert action plans that 
were conducted from 1964–1969 consisted of anticommunist propaganda. The CIA 
developed assets in major Chilean media outlets to promote U.S. global interests by 
writing articles and editorials that criticized such events as Soviet intervention in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, suppressing news harmful to the U.S. such as the Vietnam War, 
and criticizing the Chilean left.75  
The Kennedy administration was able to provide the proper inducements to the 
Christian Democrat Party and the western friendly media outlets willing to spread their 
message. This incentive was President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress in Latin 
America. President Kennedy’s program proposed $20 billion in aid to Latin American 
nations through USAID to promote democracy and social reforms.76 The Alliance for 
Progress aid package would be the largest provided in the developing world and was 
designed to provide assistance in building homes, enacting land reforms, creating job, 
providing health care, and education.77 Though the Alliance for Progress did achieve 
some success in housing, education, health care, and water purification projects; the 
program fell short of its desired ambitions of increased democracy through social and 
economic reform.78 Following President Kennedy’s assassination the program lost steam 
as President Johnson did not possess the same idealistic attitude and loyalty to social 
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reform in Chile that Kennedy did in the early years of the Alliance for Progress. President 
Johnson adopted a diplomatic stance to Chile that focused on the concern for American 
business interests.79 Another factor that led to unsustainable success of the Alliance for 
Progress was that several Latin American nations believed this to be an example of 
“Yankee Imperialism” and in U.S. self-interest following the Bay of Pigs fiasco and 
Cuban Missile Crisis.80  
The incentives provided through aid packages and development assistance was 
not enough to win over the Chilean population over the long term due to the perceived 
association of Eduardo Frei to U.S. interests in Chile. As U.S. aid administrators worked 
with members of the Christian Democratic Party to reform Chilean society by assisting 
poverty stricken peasants and the urban poor, U.S. aid would be criticized by Salvador 
Allende as an “imperialist smokescreen” to protect American investment interests. 
However, the Christian Democratic Party did triumph in the 1964 elections through the 
assistance of CIA covert action.81 The United States was able to assist in persuading the 
Chilean people to elect Eduardo Frei as president despite Soviet competition working to 
emplace political rival Salvador Allende. Additionally, pre-existing relationships and 
contacts provided the CIA an advantage over the Soviet KGB, which was just beginning 
to develop their networks in Chile. The CIA developed assets within Chilean media 
organizations to disseminate anti-Soviet propaganda and spread messages that were 
favorable to U.S. interests.82 In addition to contacts within the Chilean media to assist 
with covert propaganda campaigns, the U.S had a long standing professional relationship 
with Chilean military officers. U.S. military attachés and Military Group personnel 
attached to the Embassy numbered over 50 by the late 1960s providing assistance and 
training to the Chilean armed forces.83 The Soviets first initiated contact with Salvador 
Allende in 1961 through the KGB political intelligence officer operating in Chile. In turn, 
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Salvador Allende became a confidential contact of the KGB keeping the Soviets 
informed of political matters within Chile.84 Additionally, Soviet-Chilean diplomatic 
relations were not fully established until 1964 when the first legal KGB residency was 
stood up along with a new Soviet Embassy in Santiago.85 The KGB may have been late 
in devising their covert programs to affect the 1964 Chilean elections, but the Soviets did 
realize that Salvador Allende received 39% of the votes in the election. With some 
margin of success in the election and the growing poverty rate and social injustices that 
emerged in Chile during the 1960s, the conditions would become ripe for communist 
influence.86  
U.S. assistance through financial support would continue in Chile throughout the 
1960s; however, in April 1969 CIA director Richard Helms and CIA Latin America 
specialists warned President Richard Nixon that if swift action was not taken, Salvador 
Allende would likely win the election.87 The threat of a Soviet aligned Allende 
government sparked new rounds of covert action that would not yield the same positive 
results that occurred in the 1964 Chilean election.  
2. Track I and Track II: Shortcomings of Covert Action 
Despite the fact that President Nixon feared a Soviet aligned socialist government 
in Chile, the warnings from the CIA of an Allende victory were not acted on.88 As 
anticipated, Salvador Allende was victorious in the Chilean elections of September 1970 
defeating Christian Democrat candidate Jorge Alessandri. However, Allende was elected 
by a slim margin and under the Chilean constitution a run-off vote would be held 
between Allende and Alessandri. With the run-off vote scheduled for October 24, 1970, 
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the CIA was faced with a short time window to devise and execute a covert plan to block 
Salvador Allende from taking the presidency.89  
An exasperated President Nixon called for an emergency secret meeting with 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, CIA director Richard Helms, and Attorney 
General John Mitchell to demand CIA covert action to prevent an Allende victory. 
President Nixon did not want a nation in the Western Hemisphere falling into the socialist 
sphere on his watch and believed that a communist Chile coupled with Cuba would turn 
Latin America into a “red sandwich.”90 In response to the president’s demands, the CIA 
devised a two track plan to keep Chile from falling into the communist sphere. Track I 
consisted of political maneuvers to persuade the Chilean congress to prevent the election 
of Allende, and Track II would consist of setting the conditions for a military coup should 
Track I not succeed. CIA director Richard Helms was authorized by President Nixon to 
share information pertaining to Track I with select individuals from the Departments of 
State and Defense; however, Track II would be far more secretive and only discussed 
among those who would be directly involved in the operations.91 
Track I consisted of political action designed to return Eduardo Frei to power 
despite having already served his constitutional term as president. The “Frei re-election 
gambit” plan called for Eduardo Frei to respond to the people’s call for him to further 
serve Chile and accept the presidency should fellow Christian Democrat Jorge Alessandri 
prevail in the congressional run-off election. The gambit to re-elect Frei as president was 
based upon inducing enough votes within the Chilean Congress to elect Allesandri over 
Allende followed by the immediate resignation of Allesandri.92 The political action of 
Track I provided a constitutional solution to defeat Allende and recognize Frei as a legal 
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candidate in the election.93 On September 28, 1970, less than a month before the run-off 
election, the CIA reported to Henry Kissinger that there were 15 “journalist agents” in 
Chile to shape the public’s support to return Eduardo Frei to power.94 However, the 
devised political maneuvering of Track I was unsuccessful due to Eduardo Frei’s 
opposition to undermine the Chilean constitution by seeking a second consecutive 
presidential term after serving the mandated six-year term. Inevitably Salvador Allende 
was declared the winner of the 1970 Chilean presidential election. Many within the CIA 
believed that Track I could have been successful if there was more time to shape and 
influence both public opinion and Eduardo Frei.95  
The second phase of covert actions was put into motion after the failure of Track 
I. The secretive special Chilean Task Force set up in Langley and responsible for Track II 
bypassed the CIA station in Santiago. This task force sent four deep cover agents into 
Chile to manage covert direct action.96 Immediately, CIA agents inside Chile came to the 
realization that a military coup in Chile would be difficult due to the professional nature 
of military officers and their respect for the constitution. Additionally, Salvador Allende 
had secured support from the Non-Commissioned Officers within the Chilean armed 
forces and most importantly had the support of Commander and Chief of the Army, 
General Rene Schneider.97 The best course of action available to CIA operatives in Chile 
was to recruit Chilean military officers who were in the minority and were not loyal to 
the constitution nor President Salvador Allende.  
A plan was devised just prior to the run-off election to kidnap General Rene 
Schneider and make it appear that pro-Allende leftists carried out the action to instigate 
opposition to Salvador Allende from within the military.98 The CIA offered a $50,000 
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reward to recruit military officers who would be willing to carry out such an operation. 
Additionally, U.S. military attaches working in Chile put the CIA in contact with the 
Patria Y Liberdad Party whose members consisted of pro-fascist military officers, 
businessmen, and government officials.99 Chilean Army General Roberto Viaux from the 
Liberdad and Patria Party was willing to attempt the kidnapping of General Rene 
Schneider if the U.S. would support him. In mid-October of 1970, Viaux briefed his plan 
to a CIA contact and requested weapons and explosives to carry out the kidnapping.100 
On October 22, 1970, General Rene Schneider was killed in the botched kidnapping 
attempt. CIA historians suggest that a cable was sent on October 14, 1970 to inform 
General Roberto Viaux to refrain from carrying out the kidnapping due to its high 
probability of failure in preventing Allende from taking the presidency.101 Evidence from 
the 1975 Church Commission hearings against the CIA indicate that CIA operatives 
retrieved and disposed of the weapons used in the attempted kidnapping of General Rene 
Schneider, and money was delivered to the jailed members of the Patria and Liberdad 
following their capture.102  
In addition to undermining the political neutrality of Chilean military officers, the 
CIA also worked to turn the country’s middle class against Allende. Over $7.5 million 
dollars was funneled into Chile from 1971–73 for covert action. Funds were moved 
through the CIA friendly Chilean newspaper, “El Mercurio” to invigorate further 
opposition to Allende.103 In the fall of 1972, a strike by a truckers union initiated a series 
of national strikes that grinded all transportation in Chile to a halt for months. However, 
prolonged labor strikes would prove ineffective since they directly impacted the 
livelihood of truckers.104  
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The first attempt for a military coup took place in June of 1973 but was put down 
by loyalist military forces.105 Staff General Carlos Prats, who led the failed coup, was 
replaced by General Augusto Pinochet for future plotting against Salvador Allende. On 
September 11, 1973 a successful military coup in Chile finally occurred resulting in the 
death of Salvador Allende under mysterious conditions and General Augusto Pinochet 
seizing power. The final blow in ending Salvador Allendes presidency came as military 
units garrisoned in the capital city of Santiago under the leadership of General Camilo 
Valenzuela seized the presidential palace.106 The United States claims that it was not 
directly involved in the 1973 coup and that the CIA station in Chile was instructed to 
avoid contact with the Chilean military to distance U.S. ties with the coup.107 To the 
satisfaction of the United States, the presidency of Salvador Allende came to an end. 
However, the fall of Allende resulted in a ruthless military junta under Augusto Pinochet 
that would last 17 years. This brutal period of rule would be marred by human rights 
violations and state sponsored assassinations against political enemies occurring from 
Buenos Aires to Washington, DC.108 
3. Inevitable Failure  
The failure of covert action in Chile during the Cold War years provides a grim 
reminder of the second-/ and third-order effects of not maintaining adequate presence and 
not being patient and persistent within a targeted nation to achieve durable results. With 
Salvador Allende appearing as the frontrunner in the 1970 Chilean elections, the CIA did 
not have the ability to properly develop a realistic plan of action. The initial objective of 
the United States was to rely on politically centered parties. However, due to the urgency 
of the situation, U.S. military attaches and the CIA contacted and supported radical right 
wing groups such as the Patria and Liberdad with less than favorable results. Former OSS 
operative and CIA director William Colby wrote that the proper use of covert action is to 
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understand its benefit in a careful and long-term fashion. Colby also explains the need to 
support local leaders and groups in accomplishing their aims. Utilizing covert action to 
support a cause or a group will in turn prove more beneficial in the long term than covert 
action that is aimed directly against an adversary.109  
C. ANALYSIS 
The below analysis will examine the Chilean case study through the lens of the 
main hypothesis.  The Chilean case study will then be examined through the lens of the 
four supporting hypotheses. 
1. Chile Case through the Lens of the Hypotheses 
The Chilean case study will be examined under the thesis hypothesis that Indirect 
coercion will be a more viable policy option for political and military decision makers if 
there is a better understanding of the conditions that can make indirect coercion 
successful. When viewed through this hypothetical lens, the case of Chile provides 
insight into the contrasting conditions that existed during the 1964 and 1970 presidential 
elections. Sub-hypothesis 1a: A deliberate process of identifying potential surrogates 
based on their population penetration and compatible goals increases the success of an 
indirect coercion campaign, as demonstrated by the success of the Christian Democratic 
Party under Eduardo Frei achieving victory in the 1964 election. Leading up to the 1964 
election, the U.S. played a vital role in supporting the Christian Democratic Party through 
financial means as well as identifying groups and organizations that represented the 
various socio-economic classes of Chile to champion the cause of the Christian 
Democratic Party.110 However, the inability of the U.S. to identify a viable candidate to 
support in the 1970 election and the lack of identifying surrogates with the similar goal of 
blocking the election of a socialist candidate factored into the victory of Salvador 
Allende.  
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The analysis of the case when viewed through sub-hypothesis 1b: A coercion 
campaign that is surrogate-centric, rather than sponsor-centric, is more likely to achieve 
the intended goals and less likely to be viewed as illegitimate in the target country; is 
another factor that played into favorable results for the U.S. in the 1964 election as 
opposed to the 1970 election. With Salvador Allende as the front runner in the 1970 
election, multi-national corporations such as ITT and the copper industry in Chile 
provided funding and assistance to the CIA to deter the election of a leftist leader.111 
Unlike the 1964 election, the U.S. placed a larger emphasis on protecting business 
interests in Chile than on the wellbeing of the Chilean people.  
Hypothesis 1c: The success of a campaign of indirect coercion is not directly 
influenced by the covert or overt nature of the operations conducted under the 
overarching campaign; is viewed in terms of the covert/overt balance that occurred 
during the 1964 and 1970 Chilean elections. The 1964 elections witnessed a more 
balanced approach taken by the U.S. in regards to such covert activities as black 
propaganda and funding Western friendly media outlets and overt activities such as open 
support to the Christian Democratic Party through foreign aid packages. The Nixon 
administration focused primarily on covert activities to prevent the election of Salvador 
Allende in 1970 with little emphasis on overt activities. 
The factor of inducements is analyzed under hypothesis 1d: Positive inducements 
coupled with indirect coercion may maximize the utility of both in political warfare based 
on analysis of target vulnerabilities; to provide further understanding of the positive U.S. 
outcome to the 1964 Chilean election to that of the failure of the 1970 election. Prior to 
the 1964 election foreign aid packages created under President Kennedy provided the 
positive inducements for the Christian Democratic Party; however, positive inducements 
were not a major emphasis for the Nixon administration leading up to the 1970 elections. 
Though extensive covert operations were utilized in support of both the 1964 and 1970 
elections, the complimenting factor of positive inducements proved to be of higher utility 
in the success of the 1964 election.  
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2. Supporting Hypothesis 1 
The lack of effectiveness produced by Track I and Track II was due to the CIA 
focusing efforts and resources to block Allende’s election rather than fully supporting a 
rival candidate. The only political group that received CIA funding during the 1970 
election was a right-wing splinter group of the Radical Party. The focus of this funding 
was not to support the party or their candidate, but to reduce the number of Radical Party 
votes for Allende. The lack of support to a specific candidate proved detrimental to the 
outcome of the 1970 election in contrast to the success that was achieved in the exclusive 
support to Eduardo Frei and the Christian Democrats during the 1964 election.  
Initial U.S. efforts to use third party surrogates to affect the political balance in 
Chile resulted in the favorable election of Eduardo Frei in 1964. This success was due in 
part to the U.S. keeping with its original goal in Chile to only back political parties whose 
support base fell in the political center and avoid extreme right leaning parties. Covert 
funding and support to the Christian Democratic Party proved to be the most effective 
tool to achieve U.S. interests in Chile and avoid the emplacement of a socialist 
government that would align with the Cuban/Soviet camp.  
With a political ally in Eduardo Frei and the Christian Democratic Party, a group 
was in power to ensure U.S. interests in Chile were largely met. However, this political 
ally would soon be out of power by 1970 and drastic efforts were made to recruit third 
party surrogates that could tip the scales back to the favor of the U.S. When examining 
the decision of the U.S. to recruit disgruntled military officers belonging to the right wing 
Patria and Liberdad party to stage a coup against the newly elected socialist president 
Salvador Allende, it is evident that this decision was made out of desperation and was the 
wrong choice due to the trading of a socialist president for fascist rule that would follow 
via a successful coup.112 Additionally, using truck drivers and other unionized labor 
groups in attempts to halt Chilean transportation provided only temporary disruption. 
Private sector groups that received CIA funding supported strikers as Chilean truckers’ 
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unions did not have the funds to maintain strikes that lasted several months.113 However, 
a transportation stoppage was not capable of altering the political situation in Chile. The 
chaos that was produced by strikes resulting in transportation shortages were not 
sustainable over the long term and Allende’s Popular Unity Front was still able to gain 
eight more seats in the Chilean Congress during the March 1973 elections.114  
Chilean-American academic and Georgetown University professor Arturo 
Valenzuela writes that reaching U.S. goals and interests in Chile through the use of third 
party surrogates would have best been accomplished through leveraging the Chilean 
bureaucratic system to influence political policies. The bureaucratic system that ran 
Chile, which included the Chilean court system, was independent of the government 
therefore not under the direct control of Socialist President Salvador Allende. During the 
period that encompassed the presidency of Salvador Allende approximately 40% of 
Chilean public employees worked for 50 semiautonomous bureaus.115 Additionally, the 
Chilean upper class who occupied many of these positions in the bureaucracy was not as 
ideologically driven. The CIA made attempts from 1964–1966 to develop contacts within 
the Chilean Socialist Party and Foreign Ministry and in 1968 developed an asset who was 
a Minister within the President’s Cabinet in an effort to influence policy.116 Though the 
CIA made efforts to develop assets within Chilean bureaucracy’s to influence policy 
during the 1960s, no evidence indicates that there were any attempts made in the political 
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Another aspect that was part of the CIA political action program for the 1964 
election that was not replicated for the 1970 election was the leveraging of organized 
groups outside of government institutions.117 In efforts to influence the outcome of the 
1964 election the CIA targeted various groups that included university student 
organizations, women’s organizations, democratic labor unions, and peasants to garner 
support from all aspects of Chilean society.118 The targeting of various surrogate groups 
that represented Chilean society in support of a single candidate resulted in a favorable 
outcome in the 1964 election. The Nixon administration and the political action 
associated with Track I did not support any specific candidate, thus severely limiting the 
ability to target various facets of society to gain influence for a favorable candidate.119 
The CIA recommended in April of 1969 that an election operation needed to be initiated 
early in order to effect the upcoming 1970 election; however, no further action was taken 
by the 40 Committee, whose role was to oversee the covert activities associated with 
Track I.120 The failure of Track I and lack of a protracted political action campaign led to 
a frantic rush to hastily recruit readily available surrogates following the 1970 election of 
Salvador Allende.  
3. Supporting Hypothesis 2 
The covert/overt balance that characterized the U.S. involvement in Chile during 
the Kennedy administration produced limited short duration success. However, the covert 
actions undertaken by the Nixon administration to influence the outcome of the 1970 
Chilean presidential election was a complete failure. Examining of the case of Chile 
during the period of the 1960s through early 1970s illustrates that a covert/overt balance 
was necessary in achieving success in a coercion campaign. Covert action proved to be 
crucial in undermining communist influence in Chile; however, overt support to political 
parties opposing Salvador Allende was just as critical to prevent Chile from falling into 
the communist camp.  
                                                 
117 Ibid., 17.  
118 Ibid., 18.  
119 Ibid., 51.  
120 Ibid., 52.  
 48
Prior to the 1964 Chilean election the administration of President John F. 
Kennedy enacted a plan for Chile that blended both covert action as well as overt 
programs to dissuade the people of Chile from siding with Cuba and the Soviet Union. 
The looming fear of the nationalization of the copper industry compelled President 
Kennedy to support Chilean presidential candidate Eduardo Frei.121 The CIA financed a 
“scare campaign” using such materials as films, posters, leaflets and wall paintings that 
depicted Soviet tanks and Cuban firing squads as a stark reminder of the brutality of 
communism. Additionally, the CIA conducted disinformation and black propaganda 
campaigns by spreading false stories in an attempt to turn Chilean socialists and 
communists against each other.122 Though covert action was an important factor to the 
Kennedy administration’s overall strategy in Chile, it was balanced by the overt support 
to the moderate Christian Democratic Party and negotiations to maintain U.S. business 
interests in Chile. The CIA provided covert support to overt activities in support of Frei’s 
presidential campaign. CIA contacts provided election support through voter registration 
drives, campaigning in both urban and rural areas, and coordinating the arrangement of 
Italian Christian Democratic organizers to advise Frei on campaign techniques.123 Parallel 
to covert activities implemented through the CIA was the overt support to the Chilean 
government in the form of foreign aid loans.124  
In a January 3, 1964, memorandum from the Joseph C. King, who served as the 
Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, he wrote to CIA director John A. McCone 
explaining the tight security involved in keeping Eduardo Frei unwitting to being aided 
by the U.S. government and that major financial assistance his campaign was being 
“provided by his friends” instead of the U.S. government through covert funding. 
Additionally, on May 1, 1964, Thomas C. Mann who served as the Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs, wrote to Secretary of State Dean Rusk explaining that 
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“extraordinary caution is observed in this action campaign to conceal official U.S. 
government interest,” and the need to avoid “undue risks or excessive American 
involvement.” The effectiveness of limiting direct U.S. involvement in the 1964 Chilean 
election allowed Frei to win the election by a clear majority by organizing support at the 
village level by avoiding the appearance of a candidate acting solely on behalf of U.S. 
interests.  
By the late 1960s when then CIA director Richard Helms came to the realization 
that Chile would soon be under the presidency of Salvador Allende, there was an 
immediate sense of urgency to sway the outcome of the upcoming Chilean election. 
President Richard Nixon authorized a series of covert action in Chile to tip the balance 
against any further communist expansion in Latin America. Unlike President Kennedy, 
the Nixon administration focused primarily on a covert strategy. The plan did not yield 
the desired outcome and ultimately resulted in a military coup and the dictatorship of 
Augusto Pinochet. The Nixon administration, like many other presidential 
administrations, leaned heavily on the CIA in times of crisis to conduct covert action in 
complex situations.125 The heavy reliance on the use of covert action prevented the Nixon 
administration from exploring the use of overt measures in support to a specific political 
party or candidate to counter the election Salvador Allende. Additionally, the Nixon 
administration placed little emphasis on the overt action of political inducements to alter 
the 1970 Chilean election. The use of positive inducements against an adversary may 
provide the opportunity for new interests and preferences towards economic possibilities 
and addressing social needs, thus resulting in the conduct desired of the adversary.126 
Both CIA officials and the Soviet KGB that were working in Chile at the time of 
the election of Salvador Allende both provided feedback that an entirely covert campaign 
was the wrong approach. As previously stated, the KGB could not comprehend why the 
U.S. primarily focused on covert action and not in supporting a democratic candidate 
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more conducive to U.S. goals and aims in Chile.127 This failure in finding an equilibrium 
in the balance of covert and overt operations in turn diminished the ability of the U.S. to 
conduct a successful campaign through a third party that could have long-term influence 
in keeping Chile from joining the communist camp.  
4. Supporting Hypothesis 3 
U.S. covert involvement in support of the 1964 Chilean election provides an 
example of maintaining a surrogate-centric campaign to achieve the desired outcome. In 
contrast, the Track I political action program initiated by the Nixon administration in 
support of the 1970 election placed higher emphasis on the sponsor than the surrogates.  
The political pressure from the Nixon administration on the CIA to initiate new 
rounds of covert action in Chile in 1969 through the early 1970s stems from the 
economic situation Chile was experiencing. With a deteriorating economy, Salvador 
Allende’s Unidad Popular party gained favor among the Chilean population. With the 
socialist takeover of the Chilean government the U.S. came under pressure by 
stakeholders such as the U.S. copper industry and ITT (International Telephone and 
Telegraph) to protect American property in Chile.128 The role of U.S. multi-national 
corporations with business interests in Chile would play a more prominent role in the 
1970 election than in 1964. 
Prior to the 1964 Chilean election, representatives from multi-national 
corporations approached the CIA to offer assistance that would in turn benefit U.S. 
economic interests. Members of multi-national corporations were able to offer 
information to the CIA due to their extensive travel, knowledge, and contacts within 
Chile; however, financial funding was not accepted by the CIA in support of the 
Christian Democratic Party 1964 campaign.129 The 303 Committee, which was a 
subcommittee of the National Security Council came to the agreement that financial 
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funding from American business could not be utilized as it was an unsecure method of 
channeling funds and “not an honorable way of doing business.”130 The channeling of 
funds to the Christian Democratic Party by the CIA was conducted in a manner that 
reduced the appearance of Frei being backed by American business interests and 
maintaining a surrogate-centric campaign. 
The precedent set during the 1964 election of not accepting financial funding 
from private business would be altered during the 1970 election. Multi-national 
corporations that feared the nationalization of industry created a greater link with the CIA 
in opposition to Salvador Allende. Unlike the refusal of funding from multi-national 
corporations in the 1964 election to maintain a surrogate-centric nature of the campaign, 
the CIA encouraged ITT to assist in the 1970 election in a “more active way.”131  
5. Supporting Hypothesis 4 
The initiation of President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress in Latin America was 
an attempt to provide the necessary inducements to keep Chile out of the Soviet/Cuban 
sphere of influence and maintain favorable terms with the United States. During the early 
1960s, the U.S. attempted to make Chile a “showcase” for the Alliance of Progress. 
Economic inducements from 1962–1969 consisted of over a billion dollars in direct U.S. 
aid, loans, and grants, thus making Chile the largest recipient of aid per capita than any 
other nation in Latin America.132 The short lived success of the Alliance for Progress in 
Chile was overshadowed by Eduardo Frei and the Christian Democrats slow pace of 
implementing policies designed for long-term economic growth and development.133  
As the social and economic conditions deteriorated during the presidency of Frei 
in the late 1960s, no additional initiatives were established to provide large-scale foreign 
aid to Chile. The idealistic nature of the Alliance for Progress program initiated by 
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President Kennedy began to waver following his death in 1963 due to President 
Johnson’s growing lack of interest in social reform in Latin America.134  
In 1969, the Nixon administration introduced a new economic strategy in Chile 
that would focus on trade opposed to aid under the Alliance for Progress.135 Nixon 
viewed this approach as more rational than the idealistic approach that Kennedy had in 
initiating reform in Chile through aid. Nixon’s economic plan was based upon dealing 
with Latin American nations as part of a “mature partnership” opposed to the 
“paternalistic” nature of Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress.136 When faced with the 
growing realization that Allende would be victorious in the 1970 election the economic 
policies implemented by the U.S. during the Track I and II timeframe did little to affect 
the Chilean economy. In a September 15, 1970, meeting between CIA director Richard 
Helms and President Nixon, Helms was given the instructions to “make the economy 
scream;” additionally, a week following the meeting between Helms and Nixon, Chilean 
Ambassador Edward M. Korry informed Frei that under Allende “not a nut or bolt would 
be allowed to reach Chile.”137 Despite the Nixon administration’s attempts to coerce the 
Chilean government through monetary sanctions the political maneuvering of Track I 
designed to place Frei back into power inevitably failed.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The case study of Chile provides an example of the failure in the use of indirect 
influence that spanned nearly a decade. During the Cold War period of the 1960s into the 
early 1970s, Chile was the battleground for communist expansion into Latin America. 
The inability of the U.S. government to develop durable political relations and influence 
with Chile resulted in the Christian Democrat party losing power followed by the ousting 
of a socialist president by a military coup, which ultimately did not serve U.S. goals and 
interests in Latin America. The key factor that led to U.S. failure in Chile was the choice 
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not to react to the changing social and economic situation that occurred throughout the 
1960s. A lack of patience and persistence on behalf of the Nixon administration and the 
CIA resulted in the hastily implemented covert action that was a temporary fix at best, 
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IV. HEZBOLLAH CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Hezbollah is the operational element of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ 
(IRGC) indirect coercion campaign in Lebanon. The case study will begin with an 
assessment of Iran in order to establish the intended coercive goals to be achieved 
through Hezbollah. The assessment of Iran’s strategy will be followed by the general 
situation of the target, and a detailed description of Hezbollah’s evolution from its 
establishment to the present. Finally, the case study will provide analysis through the lens 
of the research question, and more specific analysis through testing the four hypotheses. 
Primary source information about Iran’s goals and foreign policy strategy are not widely 
available, but their actions can be interpreted to a reasonable degree in order to ascertain 
those goals. 
B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The Hezbollah case is on-going; therefore, the analysis will focus on the success 
of the coercive effort from the establishment of the surrogate to the present, which spans 
32 years from 1982 to 2014. That effort has transformed over the course of three decades, 
but during that time the players have remained the same. 
1. Sponsor Situation 
Iran, a theocratic republic, is 89% Shia Muslim and led by a Shia cleric, 
commonly referred to as the Supreme Leader. The theocratic republic was established 
after the Iranian revolution in 1979 when the Shah, the ruling monarch, was ousted from 
power. The Shah had been heavily supported by the United States. The Supreme Leader 
has direct oversight of both the IRGC and the Quds Force, which is the special operations 
command within the Iranian military.138 These two military forces are critical elements of 
Iran’s strategy for executing foreign policy. 
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Stephen Kramer boils Iran’s broad strategic goals down to two; “increase their 
influence in the Persian Gulf Region and decrease the U.S. presence there,” which are  
reiterated by Pletka and Kagan in their recent monograph on the competition between the 
U.S. and Iran.139 A major factor in the second goal is the association of U.S. support with 
reign of the Shah whose government was the target of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Israel 
is also a focal point of Iran’s foreign policy. Iranian officials have publicly stated their 
intent to annihilate Israel and liberate Jerusalem. Laurie Mylroie connects Iran’s goals of 
regional influence and its goals for Israel; “Tehran claims that Zionism, along with 
imperialism, is engaged in a conspiracy against Islam, as represented by the Islamic 
Republic.”140 Iran’s desire to increase its influence in the region is clear, but their strategy 
to achieve that influence is not. 
Moshen M. Milani states that Iran’s strategy is based on using asymmetric 
warfare for “undermining U.S. interests and increasing its own power in the vast region 
that stretches from the Levant and the Persian Gulf to the Caucasus and Central Asia.”141 
Milani continues: 
A pivotal element of Iran’s strategy of neutralizing the United States’ 
containment policy is to create spheres of influence in Syria, Lebanon, and 
among the Palestinians, as well as in Afghanistan and Iraq, by supporting 
pro-Iranian organizations and networks there.142 
Milani’s statement refers to the Iranian intent to use networks throughout the 
region to achieve their goals. The Quds Force is the primary element responsible for 
establishing relationships and sustaining support for these external networks that support 
Iranian foreign policy. 
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Muhammad Sahimi states that the original mission of the Quds Force was “to 
assist Islamic revolutionary movements in other countries.”143 The Quds Forces has been 
described as “roughly analogous to a combined CIA and Special Forces.”144 The 
priorities of the Quds Force have changed and evolved over the decades based on the 
priorities of Iran. During the Iran/Iraq war from 1980 to 1988, the focus was on 
supporting Kurdish elements against Saddam Hussein’s government, while in the 1990s it 
was focused on supporting the Northern Alliance against the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan. Throughout Hezbollah’s 30 year existence, the Quds Force maintained a 
relationship with Hezbollah, as influence in Lebanon is a priority for the Iranian 
regime.145 The exact details of the relationship are often questioned, but the fact that the 
relationship exists is accepted. 
2. Target Situation 
Lebanon is located on the east side of the Mediterranean Sea just north of Israel 
and west of Syria. The southern border of Lebanon is of critical importance to Iranian 
foreign policy. Southern Lebanon is heavily populated with Lebanese Shia who have 
historically been under-represented in Lebanese politics and overwhelmingly impacted 
by the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. In addition, Israel’s relationship to the U.S. makes 
southern Lebanon strategically important for its ability to directly impact western 
influence in the region. 
The diversity of the Lebanese population reflects the fact that it inhabits the 
crossroads of several historic empires. After World War I, Lebanon became a mandate of 
France. The French were heavily allied with and empowered the minority Christian 
Maronite population.146 In 1943, Lebanon was granted independence and established a 
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system of government called confessionalism. This system of government is 
representative based on religious sects. There are seven Christian and four Muslim sects. 
Each sect is allotted a number of seats in the Lebanese Parliament. Currently, the Muslim 
and Christian sects are each allotted 64 seats, for a total of 128 seats in Parliament. 
Hezbollah currently holds fourteen seats in the Lebanese Parliament. The system of 
government was developed in 1943 and representation was based on the official census 
from 1932. Since that time, the Shiite population has grown from Lebanon’s third largest 
group, behind the Maronites and Sunnis, to its largest group. However, their 
representation and power within the government has not significantly changed, which has 
led to significant political and economic disenfranchisement. In the book, In the Path of 
Hizbollah, Ahmad Hamzeh makes the case that all these factors contribute to the 
Lebanese Shiite community experiencing an identity crisis.147 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Lebanon was embroiled in a war with Israel while 
internal factions struggled for control of the Lebanese government. During the civil war, 
Baer states that the country split “along the lines of the three major sects – Shia, Sunni, 
and Christians.”148 He characterizes their hatred for one another as greater than their 
hatred of the Israelis. The United States and France both provided troops as part of the 
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to help stabilize the country. The 
Palestinian Liberation Organization was involved in the war and used the southern border 
area to launch attacks against Israel. This multitude of competing interests created an 
extremely unstable environment that Iran would assess and use to its advantage. 
3. Surrogate Situation 
Hezbollah is an organization that has evolved over the course of the last three 
decades. Initially, Hezbollah appeared to be strictly a terrorist organization born of the 
Iranian revolution, dedicated to using highly destructive and visible attacks to exercise its 
influence. Slowly and methodically it has grown and evolved into a political party that 
                                                 
147 Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 
12–15.  
148 Robert Baer, The Devil we Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower (New York: Random 
House, Inc., 2008), 57.  
 59
declares itself the defender of Lebanon and is a major player in the battle to influence the 
people and governments in the Middle East. The history of Hezbollah can be described in 
three phases; first the revolutionary phase beginning in 1982, second the local political 
evolution phase beginning in 1992, and third the international political player phase 
beginning in 2009. 
The foundations for Hezbollah were laid for the first phase in the late 1970s by 
the Lebanese Shia political party Amal. Amal’s leadership entered into negotiations with 
Israel to control the “Security Zone” along the border of Israel and Lebanon.149 Many 
Lebanese Shia and members of Amal were not happy with the conciliatory stance 
towards the Israeli occupation as well as support of the South Lebanese Army (SLA) 
organized to assist Israel in controlling the region. The dissention within Amal led to the 
establishment of a separate pro-Khomeini group called Islamic Amal. Sandra Mackey 
writes: “On June 12 1982, a contingent of Revolutionary Guards arrived in eastern 
Lebanon’s Baaka Valley…they began preaching their ideology in the local mosques, 
transmitting religious programming over a small radio station, and providing some basic 
social services to the war-ravaged population.”150 Their revolutionary ideology would 
appeal to those Shia that were disenchanted by Amal. This was the beginning of 
Hezbollah. After several years of recruiting, training and operating, Hezbollah issued 
their “Open Letter of 1985,” which elaborated their goals. 
The “al-Risalah al-Maftuha”151 (Open Letter), issued in February 1985, states 
Hezbollah’s religious ideology and goals. Joseph Alagha states “the Open Letter 
explicitly refers to Hizbullah’s ideology; belief in Shi’a Islam, wilayat al-faqih 
(guardianship of the jurisprudent), and jihad (struggle) in the way of God.”152 This 
ideology declares the group’s relationship to Iran, through the jurisprudent who is the 
                                                 
149 Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. 
Ltd, 2004), 41.  
150 Sandra Mackey, The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation (New York: Penguin Books, 
USA, Inc., 1996), 314.  
151 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 26  
152 Joseph Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to 2009 (Amsterdam, NLD: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 15.  
 60
Supreme Leader of Iran. The three goals of Hezbollah detailed in the “Open Letter” are 
as follows: 
1. To expel the Americans, the French and their allies definitely from Lebanon, 
putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land; 2. to submit the Phalanges to a just 
power and bring them all to justice for the crimes they have perpetrated against Muslims 
and Christians; 3. to permit all the sons of our people to determine their future and to 
choose in all the liberty the form of government they desire. We call upon all of them to 
pick the option of Islamic government which, alone, is capable of guaranteeing justice 
and liberty for all. Only an Islamic regime can stop any further tentative attempts of 
imperialistic infiltration into our country.153 
The Phalanges refers to the Maronite Christians in Lebanon who are a minority 
but were traditionally allied with the French colonialists and allotted an inordinate 
amount of power during and immediately following the colonial period. Ending foreign 
influence in Lebanese affairs is the common thread to all three of these goals. 
The first target of this foreign influence was the Israeli occupation of Southern 
Lebanon, which coincided with the establishment of Hezbollah. Hezbollah fought Israel 
from 1982 to 2000 when Israel finally withdrew its forces. During the war with Israel, 
Hezbollah’s organization evolved from a small group of fighters with a pirated radio 
station to something resembling a full government with a media/propaganda capability, 
social services, a capable militia, and intelligence and security services at its disposal. 
This leads to the second phase of Hezbollah’s evolution, as an active political party in 
Lebanon. In order to influence the Lebanese government, Hezbollah began its 
transformation to a political party in 1992. 
In 1992, the Ayatollah Khamenei approved Hezbollah to become an active 
political party and participate in the Lebanese government. In the parliamentary elections 
of that year, Hezbollah won all 12 seats on it electoral list. This was a significant step 
from a purely revolutionary group outside the structure of the Lebanese and international 
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order to recognized political entity. In the document announcing Hezbollah’s intention to 
participate in Lebanese politics, two political objectives are stated: “Lebanon’s liberation 
from the Zionist occupation and from the oppressors’ influence and …the abolishment of 
political sectarianism.”154 These objectives continue the theme of the Open Letter to end 
the foreign influence in Lebanon and establish an Islamic government. 
Hezbollah’s development has included social services provided to not only the 
Shia population in Lebanon, but also to any group of Lebanese that are affected by the 
conflict with Israel. It operates six hospitals, 10 dental clinics, and 33 dispensaries. In 
addition to the health services, Hezbollah runs schools at every level of education and 
provides scholarships that cover living and educational expenses. Hezbollah’s Education 
Unit spent over 14 million U.S. dollars on financial aid and scholarship between 1996 
and 2001. However, their growth in ability to provide social services pales in comparison 
to the growth of their Information Unit and ability to produce propaganda. 
Hezbollah’s media and propaganda capability includes everything from leaflet 
production to a variety of websites in languages ranging from Spanish to Hebrew. 
Additionally, they have an established information directorate that controls the message 
being disseminated to media outlets not under their direct control. This gives Hezbollah 
production, distribution and propagation capabilities that are almost unmatched by any 
other non-state actor, outside of actual media conglomerates. Al-Manar is the central 
element to the media empire belonging to Hezbollah. Al-Manar is a satellite television 
station that broadcasts primarily in the Middle East. It has been banned in the U.S. and 
some other nations due to its anti-Semitic themes and its relationship to a designated 
terrorist organization. It provides news and programming, and in 2000 “increased its 
daily broadcast hours from four to 24.”155 Radio Nur is the oldest element of Hezbollah’s 
broadcast media capabilities. It has been in operation since the inception of Hezbollah in 
1982 and has grown and expanded during that time. Print media is another major element 
to the Hezbollah media arm. Hezbollah publishes a newspaper called Al-Ahed, and a 
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monthly religious magazine called Baqiyyat Allah. These, in addition to publishing 
houses that produce books, make up an extensive capability to create and distribute print 
media. All media are primarily focused on the regional target audiences, Lebanese Shi’a, 
overall Lebanese population, Shi’a in other countries, and Israelis. Bridging the gap 
between the regional target audiences and the international targets are more than 20 
websites in seven different languages operated by Hezbollah. These range from websites 
associated with their other media outlets, i.e. Radio Nur, to websites dedicated to news 
and other sites belonging to specific organizations and directorates within Hezbollah. 
These websites are found in seven different languages; Arabic, English, French, Farsi, 
Hebrew, Spanish, and Azeri. 
In 1996, Hezbollah created the Syndicate Unit under the executive council. This 
unit is responsible to coordinate with Hezbollah’s representatives in the various 
professional associations and unions in Lebanon. A few of the more notable associations 
are doctors, lawyers, engineers, workers, businessmen, and students. The purpose of the 
Syndicate Unit is “to penetrate and create autonomous enclaves in the civil society that 
work to serve the party’s cause” by maintaining and directing Hezbollah representatives 
in the trade unions and associations of professionals in Lebanese society.156 Thus, the 
Syndicate Unit can influence both the parts of Lebanese society that make up these 
associations and unions, as well as the parts of the Lebanese government that are directly 
affected by these associations and unions.  
On 30 November 2009, Hezbollah issued “The New Manifesto,” marking the 
third phase of its evolution. The new document updates Hezbollah’s positions on 
Lebanese politics, specifically internal politics to include its stance on the issue of 
Palestinians in Lebanon. Additionally, it continues the theme of resistance against foreign 
influence. The New Manifesto specifically addresses what it calls “American hegemony 
and the agenda for world domination,” which it claims began following World War I.157 
These updated priorities continue the themes of the previous “Open Letter,” but take into 
account Hezbollah’s established position within Lebanese government. 
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C. ANALYSIS 
Below we will provide analysis of this case through the lens of the main 
hypothesis. Following that, we will examine the Hezbollah case based upon each of the 
four supporting hypotheses. 
1. Hezbollah through the Lens of the Hypotheses 
Hezbollah is an example of successful Iranian indirect coercion of Lebanon. Iran 
intentionally created, maintains and sustains a surrogate group, Hezbollah, in order to 
indirectly achieve its foreign policy goals of increasing Iranian influence throughout the 
Persian Gulf region while simultaneously reducing the influence of the United States. In 
his conclusion, Hamzeh states “The persistence of crisis conditions in Lebanon and the 
Middle East has given Hizbullah the freedom to act according to the circumstances and 
has rendered the Lebanese regime in particular vulnerable to the party’s challenges.”158 In 
cases such as the 2006 war with Israel, those crisis conditions have been initiated or 
instigated by Hezbollah. He goes on to say that by 2004 Hezbollah’s goal of establishing 
an Islamic Republic in Lebanon had become a “real possibility.” In regard to Iran’s other 
goal of defeating Israel and liberating Jerusalem, Hezbollah received a surge in 
popularity throughout the Middle East after claiming victory in the July 2006 war with 
Israel.159 This had the dual effect of increasing influence within Lebanon as well as 
throughout the greater region. Azani states that for Iran, Hezbollah “served as an example 
for the success of the policy of exporting the revolution.”160 Over thirty plus years, Iran 
through Hezbollah has gained major popular support within Lebanon, controls 25% of 
the Muslim seats in Lebanon’s Parliament, and has attempted to gain veto power within 
the Lebanese government. Through indirect coercion, Iran has gained the influence it 
sought. 
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2. Supporting Hypothesis 1 
Stephen Kramer discusses Iran’s assessment of Amal as a fractured Shi’a 
organization unable to effectively respond to the crisis during the Lebanese civil war. Iran 
assessed that the Lebanese Shia were 35 percent of the total population and a “genuinely 
oppressed people” by a government that was dominated by Christians and Sunni 
Muslims.161 One of the significant fractures within the Lebanese Shi’a population in the 
early 1980s was over support to the South Lebanese Army (SLA), which was assisting 
Israel with control of the security zone within Lebanon’s borders.162 Kramer describes 
how the 1500 man contingent of the IRGC infiltrated Lebanon and “took many 
prominent figures from the ranks of the Lebanese Shia Islamic AMAL, and placed them 
in charge of Hizbullah.”163 Most notably, current Hezbollah Secretary General, Hasan 
Nasrallah, was a member of Amal in the 1970s before becoming a founding member of 
Hezbollah. In addition to leadership, many of the original fighters were lured from 
Islamic Amal using the enticement of training provided by the IRGC.164 
Robert Baer phrases it slightly differently in The Devil We Know, “The IRGC 
took advantage of historical Shia ties between Lebanon and Iran.”165 The majority of Shia 
populations, even in the Middle East, are minorities within their own countries. The 
IRGC emphasizes the religious similarity between themselves and the Lebanese, while 
de-emphasizing the ethnic differences between Arabs and Persians.  
In both cases, the authors are referencing the ability of Iran, specifically the 
IRGC, to identify those on the ground who were best suited to achieve Iran’s objectives. 
Judith Harik speaks to Iran’s targeting the split in Amal, when she writes “These 
men...suited Iran’s foreign policy requirements in terms of their ideological commitments 
and willingness to act upon them.”166 Iran identified its requirements, defeating Israel and 
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reducing Western Influence in Lebanon, and targeted a segment of the local population 
that was positioned to achieve success. 
Perceptions of the origin of Hezbollah vary from source to source. History books 
suggest that Hezbollah began as “purely an underground militant group” formed to fight 
the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon.167 Tony Badran states that Hezbollah was 
“born from the struggle between Iranian revolutionary factions opposed to the shah.”168 
Whether this is the case or whether Hezbollah was established in response to the Israeli 
occupation of Southern Lebanon, Hezbollah has become a significant tool of Iranian 
foreign policy. 
Dexter Filkins details the relationships held throughout the region by the current 
commander of the Quds Force, Major General Qassem Suleimani. He describes the 
creation of Hezbollah under “Iranian guidance,” and “the Special Security Apparatus, a 
wing of Hezbollah that works closely with the Quds Force.” Filkins relates the 
relationship between the Major General and Hezbollah’s Secretary General as follows: 
“Suleimani and Nasrallah are old friends, having cooperated for years in Lebanon and in 
the many places around the world where Hezbollah operatives have performed terrorist 
missions at the Iranians’ behest.”169 A strong relationship exists between the leader of the 
Iranian military element responsible for supporting Islamic revolution outside of Iran and 
the leader of Hezbollah. In January of 2012, Suleimani was quoted in a Lebanese 
newspaper as saying “in south Lebanon…the people are under the effect of the Islamic 
Republic’s way of practice and thinking.”170 The current relationship between Suleimani 
and Nasrallah, and more generally between the Quds Force and Hezbollah, is evidence 
that Iran not only targeted the Shi’a of southern Lebanon in the 1980s to form Hezbollah 
                                                 
167 William R. Keylor, A World of Nations: The International Order since 1945, Second ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009)411.  
168 Tony Badran, “The Secret History of Hezbollah,” The Weekly Standard, December 13, 2013. 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/secret-history-hezbollah. 
169 Filkins, Qassem Suleimani, the Middle East’s most Powerful Operative.  
170 “Iran General’s Remarks on South Lebanon Draw March 14 Ire.” The Daily Star, accessed March 
8, 2014,  http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Jan-21/160604-iran-generals-remarks-on-south-
lebanon-draw-march-14-ire.ashx#axzz2vOuoqpCN.  
 66
but also have a sustained effort to maintain Hezbollah’s capabilities to export the Islamic 
revolution. 
3. Supporting Hypothesis 2 
Iran essentially created Hezbollah and maintains authority over all major 
decisions. Therefore, the goals of Hezbollah are heavily influenced, if not entirely 
determined, by the Iranian leadership. Hezbollah does claim that it is a nationalist 
movement with Lebanese interests as its primary motivation. This is contradicted by 
recent events and statements. As noted above, in 2012 the commander of the Quds Force 
stated that southern Lebanon was under the direct “effect” of Iran.171 In addition to that, 
the same commander called Hezbollah to provide “more than two thousand fighters” in 
order to assist Syrian forces retaking the town of Quasyr.172 Hezbollah has successfully 
dominated Lebanese politics, in large part due to its social programs and its narrative of 
itself as the defender of Lebanon against Israel. A significant amount of this success can 
be attributed to the very minor divergence between the goals of the sponsor and the 
surrogate. The more Hezbollah is required to do solely for the benefit of Iran, the more 
scrutiny Hezbollah will be under for not truly being a nationalist movement devoted to 
the issues of the Lebanese people. This is emphasized by the 60% of Lebanese people 
who view Hezbollah’s actions in Syria unfavorably.173 In a report to the European 
Parliament, Florence Gaub wrote that Hezbollah’s engagement in Syria “is likely to 
jeopardise its position in Lebanon proper.”174 
Iran is well aware of the need to keep Lebanon’s issues front and center for 
Hezbollah, and not to create fractures within the Shi’a population like the ones they took 
advantage of in the early 1980s. Baer writes “pitting Shia against Shia doesn’t serve 
Iran’s interests. Iran found it was more effective to steer a careful course between 
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Hezbollah and more secular Shia groups.”175 This task becomes more difficult as Iran 
tries to use Hezbollah’s capability to serve Iran’s purposes outside of Lebanon. 
4. Supporting Hypothesis 3 
Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah has not been a secret from the beginning. In the 
“Open Letter” Hezbollah stated its original goals and clearly stated that it was following 
the example of the revolution in Iran and would be part of the system of wali al-faqih, 
putting the organization subordinate to the Supreme Leader of Iran. Certain aspects of the 
relationship have been generally overt in nature, but there are several nuances of the 
relationship between Iran and Hezbollah that are not nearly as clear. 
The financial and military support that Iran gives to Hezbollah has never been 
fully disclosed. Estimates vary widely on annual financial support. One estimate puts the 
amount as low as “$25–50 million in real-world terms”176, but another puts that amount 
as high as a billion dollars.177 In his testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Dr. Matthew Levitt estimated Iran’s 
support to Hezbollah between $100–200 million annually.178 Some of the variation in 
estimates is due to whether they account for military and social programs, or only one of 
the two. Iran does provide overt support to Hezbollah and the greater Lebanese Shi’a 
population through many social programs, such as the hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies 
available throughout Shi’a dominated areas in Lebanon. 
The relationship between Hezbollah and Iran has not been covert for the majority 
of Hezbollah’s existence. The exact details of the relationship, funding and operations, 
have never been fully acknowledged by either side. Keeping the connection overt has 
allowed Hezbollah to receive money and material support that they can easily explain, as 
well as allowing them to get direction and guidance from Iran without creating the 
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appearance of impropriety in the eyes of their Lebanese constituents. The balance 
between covert and overt for Hezbollah and Iran is delicate, but is not a defining 
characteristic of the overall campaign. 
5. Supporting Hypothesis 4 
In order to analyze Iran’s use of inducements as a complement to its use of 
Hezbollah, we must consider the various targets that Iran intends to coerce. Iran uses 
inducements quite effectively in attempts to influence the Lebanese population and 
government. On the other hand, inducements are not a significant part of the strategy 
employed to coerce Israel or the West. 
As stated earlier, Hezbollah not only provides military capability to southern 
Lebanon but it also provides an enormous amount of social services. Iran’s support to the 
population of southern Lebanon through Hezbollah’s social and educational services 
serves as an inducement for the political support of that population. As stated earlier, 
Hezbollah operates a network of medical facilities that support the greater population as 
well as members of their militia. In addition, Hezbollah operates several educational 
institutions and trade schools as well as providing scholarships for many students who 
would not otherwise be able to afford schooling. They operate schools that teach applied 
sciences and religious education, such as the Technical Institute of the Great Prophet, the 
Technical Institutes of Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, the Institute of Sayydat al-Zahra’, the 
Institute of Shaykh Raghib Harb, and the Islamic Shari’ah Institute.179 In one year, 
Hezbollah is reported to spend approximately 3.5 million U.S. dollars on education 
services throughout Lebanon, compared to the Lebanese Ministry of Education’s 0.5 
million U.S. dollars. These services not only garner political support, but allow for 
increased recruitment within the targeted population. By providing these health and 
education services, Hezbollah is “exposing the ineffectiveness and illegitimacy of the 
Lebanese government.”180 
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Iran’s stated goal of annihilating Israel and liberating Jerusalem makes the 
possibility of using positive inducements unlikely. In the case of decreasing U.S. 
influence in the region, there is much more possibility for Iran to use positive 
inducements. Recently Iran’s new president has lessened the rhetoric against the U.S. and 
entered negotiations concerning its nuclear program. This is a positive inducement in the 
sense that it is something that the U.S. clearly desires, and providing it may allow for Iran 
to increase its regional influence, and simultaneously decrease that of the U.S. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Iran targeted Amal as well as the Shi’a community in southern Lebanon. Before 
undertaking the creation of Hezbollah, Iran identified two critical factors. First, Iran 
recognized that its goals and Amal’s goals were not aligned. Second, Iran identified 
fractures within the Lebanese Shi’a community that allowed it to build a surrogate and 
gain support from the necessary community. That key “fracture” was the significant 
portion of Lebanese Shi’a that did not agree with Amal’s relationship with Israel during 
the Israeli occupation. Iran created a surrogate in Hezbollah whose goal would be 
perfectly aligned with the sponsor. Of the four factors of analysis, surrogate targeting and 
the covert/overt balance for Iran were extremely relevant to success. Iran has been able to 
overtly maintain a relationship with Hezbollah, entirely based on religious, social, and 
financial support, while obscuring the military command and operational relationship.  
Less significant than the previous two factors is the surrogate versus sponsor 
centricity of Iran’s coercion campaign. Iran and Hezbollah have the identical goals of 
increasing influence over Lebanese politics and removing western influence from the 
region. Therefore, the centricity of the sponsor or the surrogate’s goals is not relevant to 
the outcome of the campaign. On the other hand, campaign centricity is more of an issue 
in Iran’s campaign to coerce Lebanese people through Hezbollah, but that has not 
hindered Hezbollah’s success up to this point. Iran’s recent use of Hezbollah to contribute 
to the fight in Syria is unpopular with the Lebanese people because it highlights the 
divergence between Hezbollah’s stated Lebanese nationalist goals and Iranian goals for 
regional influence.  
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The factor of Inducements offered to the Lebanese people has the most impact on 
the Iranian coercion campaign. Iran has been providing inducements to the Lebanese 
people since before the establishment of Hezbollah. Those inducements include the 
myriad of social services and range from solely Iranian funded, to funded and operated 
through Hezbollah.  
After the creation of Hezbollah, Iran began a campaign that included both indirect 
coercion and complementary inducements, which three decades later have proved 
exceptionally successful with Hezbollah controlling 25% of the available seats in the 
Lebanese Parliament. Our analysis of the factors of the supporting hypotheses show that 
Surrogate targeting and Inducements were and remain extremely important to Iran’s 
success, while the overt/cover nature of the campaign and sponsor/surrogate-centricity 
were not nearly as critical. 
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V. ITALY CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Following the Allied victory in Europe in WW II the wartime alliance between 
the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated and led to the Cold War conflict that 
lasted for over 40 years. As Europe began to rebuild from the devastation of WW II, the 
United States would have to persuade the nations of Western Europe against falling into 
the communist sphere of influence. The concept of political warfare would be the key 
strategy in the emerging struggle against global communist domination. The National 
Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) out of the former war 
time Office of Strategic Services (OSS). This new agency provided the United States 
another tool in achieving foreign policy goals and the ability to conduct a wide range of 
measures short of open war to achieve Cold War objectives.181  
To achieve the desired results in the 1948 Italian elections, the U.S. employed 
covert operations that complimented the overt support that was being provided to Italy 
such as aid through the Marshall Plan. To gain a better understanding of how indirect 
coercion achieved the desired outcome in Italy, this chapter will first provide a historical 
overview of the political warfare strategy utilized by the U.S. to shape the 1948 elections; 
then provide an analysis of the third party surrogates that were used by the U.S., the 
covert/overt balance of operations in Italy, the surrogate- or sponsor-centric nature of the 
campaign, and the inducements that were used in the attempt to reach U.S. strategic 
goals.  
B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The case of Italy in the late 1940s provides an example of success achieved 
through the use of political warfare to meet U.S. strategic goals. The ability of the U.S. to 
ensure the victory of a pro-Democratic government in Italy and to defeat a strong 
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communist party backed by Moscow displays the utility of political warfare in the 
emerging Cold War.  
1. Target Situation 
The Paris Peace Treaty that was signed on February 1, 1947 dismantled the Italian 
territory of Trieste along the Yugoslavian border and imposed war reparations to be paid 
by Italy to Russia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Ethiopia, and Albania. Additionally, harsh 
disarmament clauses were imposed on Italy that further worsened post war hardships. 
Italian naval fleets were either handed over as war reparations or destroyed and the air 
force was drastically reduced. The army was cut to 250,000 personnel for the purpose of 
defending the eastern border of Italy and maintaining internal order.182  
The economic hardships that emerged in the aftermath of WW II made the Italian 
Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano or PCI) appealing in the midst of increasing 
poverty. The appeal of communism began to gain traction in Italy and by the end of 1946 
the PCI comprised 2,166,000 members and posters of Joseph Stalin could be found in 
factories and on city walls throughout Italy.183 Additionally, the Italian left made 
significant gains in the municipal elections of November 1946 and the communists and 
socialists joined forces to form the Unity of Action Pact that coordinated political actions 
and policies. The strength and momentum gained by communist elements in post-war 
Italy is best described by former Deputy Director of the CIA Allen W. Dulles in a 
September 15, 1951 memorandum for the CIA Director and Chairman of the 
Psychological Strategy Board. Dulles wrote that communist strength in Italy is a product 
of the wartime underground resistance movement and that: “They seized strategic 
positions, took over building sites and appropriated other prerogatives, particularly in the 
field of the press and labor. They have never been dislodged from these positions.”  
While the Italian left worked to consolidate power, Italian Prime Minister Alcide 
De Gasperi of the Christian Democratic Party had no similar pact or alliance with other 
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moderate political parties.184 A crippled economy due to aftermath of WW II, the 
growing menace stemming from communism backed by Moscow, and a lack of 
coordination among moderate political parties created a dire situation for Alcide De 
Gasperi and the Christian Democratic Party.  
2. Sponsor Situation 
Western Europe became the pivotal frontline in the early years of the Cold War 
due to its strategic location and vital interest to the United States. Italy’s location in the 
Mediterranean connected Western Europe to the Middle East and Africa and could 
become the foundation for the emerging North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 
alliance’s southern arch.185 The possibility of Italy falling under an openly elected 
communist government in 1948 posed a major threat to the interests of the United States 
in Western Europe and the Mediterranean as key ports and shipping lanes would fall 
under the influence of Moscow. One of the first major political warfare initiatives carried 
out by the United States against the Soviet Union was dissuading Italy from falling into 
the communist sphere of influence. With a rapidly growing communist party and a 
subversive political campaign directed by Moscow, the 1948 Italian presidential elections 
would be a pivotal event in pushing back Soviet expansion into Western Europe. The 
Italian crisis of 1947–1948 was the first experiment after the war conducted by the United 
States in covert political operations and set the framework for combatting communism 
during the Cold War. The concept of political warfare was viewed by the U.S. not only as 
a key strategy to prevent a communist victory in the 1948 election, but also as a viable 
strategy to contain and ultimately defeat the Soviet Union.186  
The primary goals of the U.S. in Italy during the early years of the Cold War were 
to prevent a communist takeover and reduce the appeal and electoral strength of the 
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Italian Communist Party (PCI).187 The three main objectives of U.S. foreign policy in 
Italy to counter the communist threat would consist of: 1. strengthening the control of 
moderate political forces, 2. maintaining a market oriented socioeconomic system, and 3. 
shaping Italy’s foreign policy objectives and military posture within the organizational 
framework of NATO.188 Coupled with these three policy objectives in Italy was the 
pledge of U.S. economic aid to assist Italy in recovering from WW II. The “Truman 
Doctrine” was initiated in post-war Europe and pledged U.S. support to free people who 
were resisting subjugation by armed minorities and outside groups. Funding for the 
Truman Doctrine was through the European Recovery Plan (ERP), or Marshall Plan, and 
was the key inducement to sway Italy towards a Western alignment.189 
The challenge posed to the U.S. in altering the outcome of the 1948 elections 
consisted of influencing the Italian political situation and fighting the overarching threat 
of global communism. The U.S. considered the possible victory of the Italian Communist 
Party as an extension of the ongoing struggle with the Soviet Union and halting the “Red 
Flood” from encroaching into Western Europe was key.190 The threat of a communist 
takeover in Italy was further intensified in September of 1947 when Palmiro Tagliatti, a 
founding member of the Italian Communist Party who spent the duration of WW II in 
exile in Moscow, brought forth the possibility of the communist party taking up arms 
against the Italian government.191  
Adding credence to the threat of a pro-communist armed insurrection in Italy was 
the U.S. intelligence estimate identifying approximately 50,000 well-armed veteran 
fighters of the Italian resistance against the Nazi’s who could be supplied and reinforced 
by communist leader Josef Broz Tito in neighboring Yugoslavia.192 Additionally, by 
1948 Italy witnessed a rise in worker strikes and demonstrations due to public 
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dissatisfaction with rising prices and money shortages. These deteriorating conditions led 
the U.S. State Department to believe that the conditions on the ground placed Italy in a 
“pre-revolutionary stage” and vulnerable to a communist takeover by the PCI.193 
3. Surrogate Situation 
The process of identifying feasible surrogates to conduct political warfare was 
facilitated by an array of entities that could support U.S. goals and interests in Italy. 
Viable surrogates to support U.S. objectives in Italy came from pre-existing OSS contacts 
from WW II, organized labor, and the Vatican. Additionally, the U.S. was able to enlist 
the assistance of prominent members of the Italian-American community such as New 
York City Mayor Vincent Impelliteri and former middleweight boxing champion Rocky 
Graziano to influence Italian voters to support Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi 
and the Christian Democratic Party.  
Former OSS operative and early CIA member James Jesus Angleton played a key 
role in developing contacts within the Italian security services. Angleton, who assisted in 
reinstituting the security apparatus in Italy following WW II enabled the U.S. to gain 
influence over the Italian security services.194 Additionally, U.S. labor unions were able 
to leverage and gain influence over the communist dominated labor unions in Italy. The 
Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), a foreign affairs department of the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), sought to break the communist control of Italian organized 
labor. The CIA- funded FTUC would provide support to the anticommunist and Catholic 
dominated Italian General Confederation of Labor (Libera Confederazione Generale 
Italian de Lavaro).195  
U.S. political support in post-war Italian politics against communism would be 
placed in the conservative and moderate Christian Democratic Party.196 The Christian 
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Democrats were viewed by the Truman administration as the best means to keep Italy 
from falling into the communist sphere of influence. The U.S. Ambassador to Italy, 
James Clement Dunn, believed that the new Italian government led by Christian 
Democrat Alcide De Gasperi would promote the necessary economic and institutional 
reforms to modernize and democratize Italy.197  
The U.S. would have the ability to shape the Italian political process by 
leveraging the deeply rooted tradition of the Catholic Church in Italy to counter 
communism. The Civic Committee (Comitati Civici) led by Catholic activist Luigi Gedda 
was an anticommunist organization that had the full support of Pope Pius XII. Luigi 
Gedda would become a contact for the U.S. who could utilize Catholic civic action to 
spread the message of anti-communism.198 The role of the Vatican and Catholic Church 
in Italy proved to be a critical factor in U.S. psychological warfare efforts to influence the 
Italian people to vote against the PCI. 
It was the norm to have communist participation in government under the 
coalition government that was established in Italy following WW II. The threat of a 
communist victory in the 1948 elections led the U.S. to pledge support to the Christian 
Democratic Party if communists were expelled from the coalition government. Despite 
having a coalition government intended for various political parties, the communists were 
excluded from power and eventually evicted from the Italian coalition government by 
May 1947.199 The move by the Christian Democratic Party to evict communist members 
of the coalition government was carried out in the anticipation that the U.S. would be 
more likely to provide financial assistance if the Italian government was free of 
communist influence.200  
Alcide De Gasperi prevailed in the 1948 elections despite the menacing threat 
imposed by the communist party. The Christian Democrats who had polled 36 percent in 
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the 1946 elections went on to win 48.5 percent of the total vote and an absolute majority 
in the parliament in 1948.201 The anticommunist political platform of De Gasperi coupled 
with the assistance and support of the Vatican and U.S. resulted in the sound defeat of the 
Italian left. The victory of De Gasperi on 18 April 1947 highlighted the utility that 
political warfare and the role indirect coercion could play in the emerging Cold War.  
C. ANALYSIS 
The case study of Italy will first be examined through the lens of the main 
hypothesis. The case study will then be examined through the lens of the four supporting 
hypotheses. 
1. Italy Case through the Lens of the Hypotheses 
The following analysis of the Italian case study will be examined under the thesis 
hypothesis that is: Indirect coercion will be a more viable policy option for political and 
military decision makers if there is a better identification process of the conditions that 
make indirect coercion successful. When viewed through the lens of the hypothesis the 
case of Italy provides insight into the conditions that existed prior to the 1948 presidential 
elections that were ripe for a communist takeover. The U.S. was able to identify and 
exploit these conditions and ultimately keep Italy out of the Soviet sphere of influence.  
Three factors that proved to be critical to securing a Christian Democrat victory in 
April of 1948 were: 1. U.S. economic aid and the positive effects of the Marshall Plan,  
2. the assistance the Catholic Church provided the Christian Democrats, and 3. De 
Gasperi’s ability to exploit the issue of communism.202 The use of political warfare and 
indirect coercion by the U.S. enabled these three factors to reach fruition and secure a 
victory over communism. The successful indirect coercion campaign carried out in Italy 
was due to the ability of the U.S. to: 1. identify surrogates based on their population 
influence, 2. maintain a surrogate-centric campaign, 3. employ both overt and covert 
measures and 4. utilize positive inducements based on target vulnerabilities. 
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2. Supporting Hypothesis 1 
The effectiveness to influence the outcome of the 1948 Italian election was a 
result of the ability of the U.S. to draw upon the anticommunist sentiments of surrogates 
to achieve victory at the voting booths. Politically, the U.S. found an ally in Alcide De 
Gasperi and the Italian Christian Democratic Party. The moderate Christian Democrats 
would become the instrument in which U.S. aid and assistance would be invested into to 
defeat the PCI domestically in Italy and support the overarching geopolitical goal 
defeating communism in Western Europe. Despite having a political ally in the Christian 
Democratic Party, the CIA would face a great challenge in dislodging the communist 
influence that had become deeply entrenched in Italy following WW II.  
Surrogate targeting for U.S. covert efforts in support of the 1948 Italian elections 
were facilitated by pre-existing intelligence sources developed during WW II. James 
Jesus Angleton had influence over the covert aspects of surrogate entities and a vast 
understanding of Italian political life dating back to his war time service with the OSS.203 
In addition to OSS contacts, Angleton’s father, Hugh Angleton, established an unofficial 
espionage network in Italy from 1939–1941. This espionage network was developed prior 
to U.S. involvement in WW II when Hugh Angleton worked in Italy as the owner of the 
National Cash Register and president of the Italian Chamber of Commerce. Following the 
war, Hugh Angleton returned to Italy to further develop his former intelligence assets to 
assist in countering the communist threat.204 As WW II ended and Italian fascism 
collapsed, James Angleton had the vision to recognize the new threat the U.S. faced and 
began to target Italy’s communist networks.205  
A major achievement carried out by James Angleton following the end of WW II 
was his role in the reinstitution of Italian intelligence services. The ability of Angleton to 
reshape the Italian intelligence apparatus provided loyal contacts experienced in working 
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against Soviet intelligence since the beginning of WW II.206 Developing surrogates in the 
Italian intelligence services would play a crucial role in defeating the PCI and 
understanding Soviet strategy in Italy. Following the war, Angleton assisted in standing 
up a counter-intelligence unit within the Carabinieri (Italian Military Police). This 
counter-intelligence unit was able to recruit spies that penetrated the Italian communist 
and socialist political parties as well as the Vatican.207 By developing assets within the 
Italian Naval Intelligence Service and in the Italian Servio Informazio Segreta (SIS), 
Angleton received reports on meetings between Italian agents and Soviet intelligence 
operatives and decoded Soviet messages sent to field agents in Italy and the 
Mediterranean.208 Additionally, Angleton developed intelligence sources that worked 
throughout Rome and conducted such covert acts as stealing documents, codes, and 
cipher books from the Italian Ministry of Interior to gain intelligence pertaining to 
communist activities. The intelligence sources developed by Angleton also provided the 
CIA potential recruits including Italian journalists and military officers.209 
Another significant factor in surrogate targeting that resulted in a favorable 
outcome in the 1948 Italian elections was the ability of the U.S. to penetrate and leverage 
prominent Italian institutions to influence the local population. One such crucial and 
powerful institution within Italian society that the U.S. was able to penetrate was the 
Vatican. The U.S. was able to leverage the anticommunist sentiment of the Catholic 
Church and the phobia of Pope Pius XII had of Godless communism prevailing in Italy. 
Prior to WW II the Pope condemned both Nazism and communism totalitarian systems of 
government. Following the war the Vatican viewed the Yalta Summit negatively as small 
nations were surrendered to the powerful Soviet Union. The Vatican’s fear of communist 
encroachment was further fueled following the communist seizure of power in Poland, 
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia and the growing domestic threat posed by the PCI.210 
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The Catholic Church became a vital instrument of anticommunist propaganda for 
U.S. political warfare efforts in Italy. The U.S. capitalized on the fears within the Vatican 
of a communist takeover in Italy that threatened the very existence of the Catholic 
Church by supporting the anticommunist propaganda of the Comitati Civici (Civic 
Committee) led by Luigi Gedda. Gedda, who was a prominent figure in the Catholic 
Action movement in Italy, became a key contact of the U.S. Embassy in Rome to 
leverage the Church as a means to defeat communism in Italy. Father Giovanni Battista 
Montini who served as the Vatican’s Secretariat of State and would later become Pope 
Paul VI put Gedda in contact with a U.S. Embassy official and possible CIA agent named 
John McKnight. Through the efforts of Father Montini and the McKnight, Luigi Gedda’s 
Catholic Action movement received financial support through the sale of U.S. surplus 
war materials whose proceeds went to the Vatican.211 The message put out by the Vatican 
and Catholic Action pertaining to the 1948 election was that of Catholicism vs. 
communism and the civic duty of the Italian people to vote against Communism. Luigi 
Gedda would be the local contact who could disseminate the anticommunist message to 
the Italian people at the grass roots level as part of the U.S. psychological warfare 
strategy.212  
Another aspect of Italian society that the U.S. was able to gain influence over to 
counter the communist threat of the 1948 elections was organized labor. The 
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavaro (Italian General Confederation of Labor 
(CGIL)) was established in 1944 as the Italian national labor union, and by 1947 was 
under Communist control. The power held by the communists over the CGIL resulted in 
political strikes throughout the fall and winter of 1947 to protest the government of 
Alcide De Gasperi and caused President Truman to fear that an insurrection by the 
communists could soon follow.213  
To undermine the communist influence over organized labor, the CIA financed 
the European activities of the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), which served as the 
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foreign affairs department for the American Federation of Labor (AFL). The funding and 
support provided by the CIA and the FTUC/AFL resulted in a split within the CGIL. The 
anticommunist members within the CGIL formed the Catholic dominated Libera 
Confederazione Generale Italiana Lavaro (Free CGIL).214 In addition to financial support 
to Italian anticommunist labor, the U.S. undermined communist dominated labor by 
manipulating the awarding of foreign labor contracts and which ports would receive 
foreign aid in Italy. Non-communist labor unions were supported by the U.S. directing 
the shipping, crews, and selection of ports that Marshall Plan aid would enter Italy to 
break the power of communist labor unions.215 
The U.S. tactic of utilizing anticommunist Voice of America broadcasts 
conducted by prominent Italian-Americans was also employed to influence organized 
labor. One such prominent Italian-American labor leader was Luigi Antonini. Antonini, 
who organized the Italian-American Labor Council in New York and worked as an AFL 
advisor to Italian labor, joined other prominent labor leaders such as James Carey of the 
AFL and Dave Beck of the Teamsters Union to appeal to Italian voters to reject 
communism at the voting polls.216 
3. Supporting Hypothesis 2 
The campaign carried out by the newly established CIA in Italy exemplifies a 
model of success when covert activities are integrated with overt U.S. programs to 
maximize effects.217 This compliment of U.S. covert and overt activities to achieve 
success in the 1948 Italian elections is expressed in a July 26, 1951 memorandum from 
Italian Ambassador James Clement Dunn to Deputy Director of the CIA Allen Dulles. 
Dunn wrote that “the reduction of communist activities and power in Italy is based upon 
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a combination of propaganda and assistance in in economic recovery.”218 Though the role 
of covert activities assisted and enhanced the overall campaign in Italy, the overt and well 
publicized partnership between the Truman administration and Alcide De Gasperi and the 
Christian Democrats proved highly beneficial in reaching the desired end state. 
Cold War historian Dr. James Callahan wrote that “covert action played a 
relatively limited role in securing the De Gasperi’s electoral victory in 1948.”219 Callahan 
suggests that the success of De Gasperi and the Christian Democrats was due to the overt 
support provided by the U.S. prior to the 1948 elections. The two main objectives of the 
U.S. overt campaign consisted of: 1. Optimizing the appeal of the democratic 
anticommunist parties and convincing the Italian people that their best option was to 
secure a future with the Western Bloc, and 2. Alert the Italian people to the dangers of 
voting in favor of communism in an attempt to cause a rift in the USSR and PCI/PSI 
alliance.220 The overt assistance the U.S. provided to Italy following WW II was in itself 
seen as anticommunist propaganda. James Edward Miller of the U.S. Department of State 
Historical Office wrote that: “U.S. propaganda underlined the importance of Marshall 
Plan aid and the fact that no communist nation was participating in the European 
Recovery Plan.” Additionally, Miller elaborates how Ambassador James Clement Dunn 
would often greet U.S. ships carrying Italian aid at dockside as a means of propaganda to 
the Italian people.221 
Despite the suggestion made by Callahan that the overt relationship between the 
U.S. and De Gasperi coupled with Marshall Plan aid provided sufficient anticommunist 
propaganda, CIA funded black propaganda was highly useful in persuading the Italian 
population against the communist party. Mark Wyatt, who served in Rome’s CIA station 
during the period of the 1948 Italian elections, provides an account of how the CIA 
strongly supported anticommunist newspapers. Additionally, the CIA enlisted the 
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assistance of Italian cartoonists who were able to portray prominent communist leaders in 
satirical caricatures as a method of propaganda. One such example that Wyatt provides is 
a poster with the words “I trust” and “I obey” under a degrading caricature of Joseph 
Stalin labeled as “Il Buffone,” Italian for a silly clown. Wyatt credits the success of 
covert CIA propaganda efforts to the brilliant ideas and capabilities of Italian journalists 
and their getting involved early in the game.222  
Despite the benefit of a highly overt relationship between the U.S. and De 
Gasperi, Ambassador Dunn recognized the utility in covert activities and psychological 
warfare to defeat the communists in the 1948 elections. Ambassador Dunn who 
recognized the advantage of publicizing U.S. aid to Italy as propaganda against the 
communist party also realized the need to covertly fund the Christian Democrats and the 
Partito Socialista dei Lavoratori Italiani (Socialist Party of Italian Workers (PSLI)) who 
had split with the leftist Italian Socialist Party to form an anticommunist coalition in 
Italy.223 Covert funding for the Christian Democrats was conducted through a private 
New York bank and funding for the PSLI came through a New York law firm. 
Additionally, private companies and American trade unions were another source to 
covertly fund Italian political parties and maintain the animosity of the U.S. Embassy in 
Rome.224 Mark Wyatt, explains in a 1996 interview with the National Security Archives, 
the importance of the contacts he made with prominent Italian-Americans in the banking 
and industrialist fields. One such prominent figure that the CIA was in contact with who 
supported the Christian Democratic Party was Amadeo Peter Giannini who was the 
founder of the Bank of America.225  
Mark Wyatt also provides insight into the success the CIA achieved in the 
clandestine passing of funds to the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties. 
Wyatt explained the difficulty in passing black bags of money due to the busy nature of 
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the recipients who worked set schedules in the Italian government and the threat of being 
compromised by the large Soviet presence in Rome that was supporting communist 
parties. Despite the difficulties and risk associated with passing funds to anticommunist 
political parties, Wyatt stated that, “they’d never been able to produce photographs of an 
American officer of the CIA, under embassy cover, passing a bag to a well-known 
Christian Democrat or Social Democrat.”226  
Covert funding was facilitated by a complex procedure implemented by the CIA 
to ensure that the money laundering program to aid the 1948 elections remained legal and 
secret. To accomplish this task the CIA enabled businesses and organizations to 
financially contribute without violating tax laws, utilized an internal audit procedure, and 
hid the CIA connection through various front organizations.227 In addition to covertly 
funding Italian anticommunist political parties, the CIA orchestrated a “black 
propaganda” campaign to bring the Italian population to the attention of the brutality 
carried out by the Soviet Army in Eastern Europe. CIA propaganda that was planted in 
local and national newspapers depicted menacing pictures and stories from behind the 
Iron Curtain such as the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia.228  
The 1948 Italian elections highlighted the value of psychological operations in 
waging political warfare to gain influence over and condition political allegiances and 
public behavior in Italy. The victory achieved by the Christian Democrats in the 1948 
Italian election lent credence to the Truman administration that psychological warfare 
was a legitimate tool of U.S. foreign policy and key to the Cold War strategy.229 As part 
of the covert/overt balance, the U.S. approach to the 1948 Italian elections was that the 
waging of psychological warfare was the duty of the Italian government and 
anticommunist parties to delegate down to local actors.230 The strategy of delegating 
psychological warfare down to local actors with the U.S. only providing guidance, 
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funding, and instruction was crucial in gaining anticommunist support at the grass roots 
level. Individuals such as Luigi Gedda of the Catholic action civic committee is an 
example of anticommunist messages crafted by the U.S. Embassy and Vatican being 
disseminated down to the village level by a local actor.  
4. Supporting Hypothesis 3 
The case of Italy provides an example of a surrogate-centric campaign despite the 
heavy overt nature of U.S. involvement due to the European recovery effort following 
WW II. A key to maintaining the surrogate centricity was due to the goal convergence 
shared by the U.S. and influential Italian anticommunist entities. Additionally, vital to the 
surrogate centricity was the well-developed and pre-existing intelligence and auxiliary 
networks. The pre-existing contacts and networks that dated back to WW II provided the 
U.S. a medium to spread the message of anti-communism to the Italian population. 
Kaetan Mistry, who has written on political warfare in the 1948 Italian election, suggests 
that it was the intimate working relationship between Ambassador Dunn and the 
anticommunist coalition of the Christian Democrats and PSLI that encouraged U.S. 
intervention in the 1948 elections. Additionally, the Vatican who also shared 
anticommunist sentiment and would benefit from the defeat of communism also 
encouraged U.S. intervening in the 1948 elections.231 The key to success that Mistry 
highlights is that the Italian political parties and the Vatican who were advocates of U.S. 
involvement and support for the 1948 elections were able to utilize their own narratives 
and networks to reach their domestic audiences.232 
Throughout the 1948 Italian elections Ambassador James Clement Dunn stressed 
the importance of maintaining the appearance of the Italian government as the key factor 
to achieving victory. In a July 26, 1951, memorandum to Deputy Director of the CIA 
Allen Dulles; Ambassador Dunn wrote that, “the most effective action in influencing the 
Italian people away from communism would be that taken by the Italian government 
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itself.”233 Additionally, drawn from his experiences in the 1948 Italian elections, 
Ambassador Dunn wrote that “a most effective way of combating communism is by word 
of mouth” and “that by organizing democratic political groups at the grass roots level in 
industrial centers workers are approached on a personal basis.”234 
Existing variables such as high illiteracy rates and the predominance of 
Catholicism in Italy facilitated organizations such as Luigi Gedda’s Catholic Civic 
Committees to achieve the U.S. goals by spreading the message of anti-communism at 
the local village level. The ability to promote anti-communism through a prominent 
Italian figure in pre-existing institutions such as the Catholic Church created the 
credibility of a surrogate-centric campaign.235  
5. Supporting Hypothesis 4 
Positive inducements provided to Italy were initiated by the Truman 
administration immediately following WW II. U.S. aid and economic assistance were 
provided in the efforts to rebuild Western Europe and prevent alignment with the Soviet 
Union. On 17 December 1947 President Truman signed an interim aid package that 
would serve as a short-term fix designed to inject essential raw materials and foodstuffs 
into the Italian economy. This rapid short-term aid package was introduced as an initial 
incentive to dissuade Italians from the appeal of communism.236 During a January 1947 
visit to Washington, DC, De Gasperi met with President Truman and Secretary of State 
James F. Byrnes to discuss economic issues in Italy and the threat imposed by the Italian 
left. De Gasperi stressed the importance of financial support provided by the U.S. as a 
means to defeat communists in Italy.237  
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Major U.S. economic assistance to Italy would occur for a ten year period from 
1944–1954. During this timeframe Italy would receive European Recovery Plan 
(Marshall Plan) aid, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRA) 
aid, and Mutual Security Military aid for a total of 5.5 billion dollars. While extending 
substantial economic aid the Truman administration suggested to De Gasperi that the 
U.S. would look more favorably upon an Italian government that did not have communist 
parties participating in its Parliament. This bargaining initially resulted in the left being 
allocated fewer seats in Italian ministries by February of 1947. As U.S. aid to Italy 
increased and the threat of a communist victory in the 1948 increased, Ambassador Dunn 
sent a message to Secretary of State Marshall stating that “aid to Italy perhaps should be 
based on quid pro quo of necessary changes in political orientation and policies.”238 In 
May of 1947, six days after Ambassador Dunn sent this message; De Gasperi dissolved 
his cabinet and created a new government coalition that excluded both communist and 
socialist parties.239 The use of economic aid as a political bargaining chip was reinforced 
to De Gasperi through the indirect, yet apparent warnings from Ambassador Dunn that 
U.S. aid would cease to flow if Italy was fall into the hands of the communists.240  
D. CONCLUSION 
The case study of Italy provides a successful example of the ability of the U.S. to 
indirectly reach a desired political outcome. Through both overt and covert measures the 
U.S. set the conditions for the 1948 elections once it was identified that De Gasperi and 
the Christian Democrats shared the same anticommunist sentiment. When examining the 
four factors that were analyzed as the supporting hypotheses of this thesis,’ the two 
factors that had the most prominent effect in the Italy case were those of surrogate 
targeting and positive inducements.  
Surrogate targeting was facilitated by a thorough understanding of the Italian 
political situation and society. The U.S. was able to identify surrogate networks 
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comprised of such prominent entities as the Catholic Church that could influence the 
population against voting communist. The role of prominent indigenous institutions as 
the Vatican and individuals such as Luigi Gedda created a surrogate-centric campaign 
that enabled victory for the Christian Democrats. The use of Marshall Plan aid as a 
positive inducement enhanced the existing surrogate network that spread anticommunist 
messages at the grass roots level. Overt U.S. aid assisted the Italian population not only in 
rebuilding from the destruction of WW II, but showing the Italians that the U.S. was 
committed to supporting the free people of Western Europe. Additionally, the Marshall 
Plan worked as a positive inducement due to the fact that the Soviet Union had no such 
aid and reconstruction programs. Former CIA agent Mark Wyatt described how the 
Marshall Plan was a tremendous program that helped to rebuild Western Europe. 
However, in his 1996 interview with the National Security Archives on U.S. operations in 
Italy, Wyatt explains that as noble as the Marshall Plan was, its purpose was primarily to 
secure U.S. interests: 
We were helping rebuild Italy, Germany, what have you; but the important 
thing –and Marshall knew this-it was completely in America’s interest, 
our national security interest, to do it. Fine that it helped them, but damn 
it, we had to do it in our own interest.241 
The struggle against communism in Italy did not end with the electoral victory of 
De Gasperi and the Christian Democratic Party in 1948. The communist party in Italy 
would challenge democratic entities until up until the end of the Cold War. However, the 
groundwork provided by the U.S. following WW II and the support to the 1948 elections 
set the conditions to keep Italy from falling to communism. Former OSS operative, CIA 
agent, and eventual CIA director, William Colby, who served in Italy during the 1950s, 
relates U.S. success in Italy to having a long-term strategy of covert political assistance to 
democratic entities. Colby stated that such a strategy “demonstrates the utility and even 
the morality of secret assistance to foreign friends with a subversive challenge.”242  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
The below analysis summarizes the factors that explain the success or failure of 
each of the four thesis case studies, in terms of the hypothesis and supporting hypotheses. 
1. Indonesia 
The case of Indonesia serves as the example of a complete failure in the U.S. 
carrying out a campaign of indirect coercion. The inability of the Eisenhower 
administration to successfully coerce the Sukarno government into the Western sphere of 
influence resulted from not understanding the complex political and ethnic nature of 
Indonesia. The two factors that greatly contributed to the failure of the Indonesia case are 
positive inducements and surrogate targeting. The lack of any substantial positive 
inducements from the U.S. to the Sukarno government is best described in a 1957 
correspondence from Secretary of State John Dulles to the U.S. Embassy in Australia. 
Dulles writes that “U.S. grant aid to Indonesia in the current fiscal year is about  
$11 million in technical assistance, malaria control and police training—hardly a lever of 
major consequence.”243  
The inability to identify viable surrogates to gain influence over the government 
in Jakarta also was a pivotal factor that contributed to the unsuccessful coercion 
campaign in Indonesia. The emphasis of the Eisenhower administration was placed on 
providing support to anticommunist rebel factions to prevent Indonesia from falling into 
the communist sphere of influence. The rebel factions that received CIA supported may 
have been anticommunist, but anticommunist military officers also existed within the 
Indonesian military. Supporting anticommunist military officers may have been the better 
option to gain influence over the Sukarno government. Rebel groups may have been 
readily available to use as surrogates; however, the use of anticommunist rebel factions as 
surrogates were insufficient due to a lack of sponsor/surrogate goal convergence. 
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In addition to a lack of positive inducements and the inability to utilize viable 
surrogate entities, the U.S. coercion campaign in Indonesia was short in duration, which 
also contributed to failure. The short-term fix of CIA support to rebel factions did not 
carry the same utility that a protracted and carefully crafted plan of action would have 
carried. Additionally, U.S. efforts to sway the Sukarno government from a position of 
neutrality to that of anti-communist were attempted primarily through military means and 
lacked any sustained political and diplomatic efforts. 
2. Chile 
The case of Chile provides an example of initial success followed by failure in 
U.S. coercive efforts to influence a political landscape. Initially, under the Kennedy and 
then Johnson administrations, the U.S. was able to influence the favorable outcome of the 
1964 Chilean elections. The factors that greatly contributed to successful U.S. coercion 
efforts were positive inducements and surrogate targeting. Positive inducements to Chile 
came in the form of President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress. The Alliance for 
Progress provided over a billion dollars in economic assistance. This in turn made Chile 
the largest recipient of U.S. assistance in Latin America.  
Also contributing to the initial success in Chile during the 1964 elections was 
effective surrogate targeting. The Kennedy administration made the decision to only 
support political parties in the center of the political spectrum. The Christian Democratic 
Party and candidate Eduardo Frei provided the U.S. a viable center oriented political 
party to support. Complementing U.S. support to a pro-democratic political party was the 
ability of the CIA to target groups such as student and women’s organizations, 
democratic labor unions, and peasants to support Frei. By garnering support from Chilean 
groups that crossed all aspects of society, the U.S. was able to facilitate the promotion of 
pro-democratic ideals at the grass roots level in Chile.  
Unlike U.S success in influencing the outcome in the 1964 election, the Nixon 
administration was unsuccessful in preventing the Allende victory in 1970. The factors 
that greatly contributed to the U.S. failure in the 1970 election were a lack of effective 
surrogate targeting, no substantial positive inducements, and relying too heavily on 
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covert action to block the election of Allende. In the lead-up to the 1970 election, the 
Nixon administration did not support a specific candidate or political party. Additionally, 
by not supporting a specific candidate, the CIA was unable to target groups within 
Chilean society that could provide support to a pro-democratic candidate. Unlike the 
1964 election, the robust surrogate network of groups and organizations that represented 
the various factions of Chilean society at the grass roots level did not exist for the 1970 
election. 
The Nixon administration did not provide any economic assistance or aid to Chile 
in the lead-up to the 1970 election. Additionally, the heavy reliance on covert action by 
the Nixon administration in the 1970 Chilean elections was a key factor in the failure to 
prevent an Allende victory. The hastily planned covert action associated with Track I and 
II did not achieve the desired results of the Nixon administration and illustrates the need 
for an overt balance. Without overt U.S. support to a specific candidate or political party, 
the covert action of Track I and II did not compliment an overall coercion campaign. 
3. Hezbollah 
The case of Lebanese Hezbollah provides an example of significant success 
achieved through a campaign of indirect coercion. The two key factors that greatly 
contributed to the success of Hezbollah as a tool of Iranian foreign policy in Lebanon 
were surrogate targeting and positive inducements. Effective surrogate targeting stems 
from the IRGC infiltration into Lebanon during the early 1980s and identifying fractures 
within the Shia population. The existing rift within the Shia population between the South 
Lebanese Army (SLA) and the Lebanese Shia Islamic AMAL provided ripe conditions 
for the IRGC to take advantage of fractures within the AMAL through their Shia identity. 
In the early 1980s the IRGC was successful in identifying key personalities and 
leadership from the AMAL and bringing them into Hezbollah based on ideological 
similarities in hopes of defeating Israel and reducing Western influence in Lebanon. The 
successful targeting of Lebanese surrogates beginning in the early 1980s has resulted in 
Hezbollah growing from a localized militia into a highly politicized organization that is 
able to promote Iranian regional goals and interests outside of Lebanese borders. 
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Hezbollah has been able to successfully utilize positive inducements on the 
Lebanese population as it grew from a predominantly military organization to a political 
entity. Through Iranian support, Hezbollah has been able to provide social services and 
educational opportunities to the population of Southern Lebanon. The use of positive 
inducements to the Lebanese population has resulted in growing local support for 
Hezbollah. Simultaneously the regional influence of Israel and the West  have been 
reduced, satisfying one of Iran’s strategic goals.  
4. Italy 
The case of Italy provides an example of success and the utility of political 
warfare to alter the outcome of the 1948 Italian elections. The two factors that greatly 
contributed to the success of the coercion campaign in Italy were those of surrogate 
targeting and positive inducements. Effective surrogate targeting by the U.S. directly 
resulted in pro-democracy/anticommunist messages reaching several facets of Italian 
society at the grass roots level. The ability of the U.S. to leverage the Catholic Church 
was crucial to spreading the message of anti-communism through a respected and 
influential institution. Working under the guidance of the U.S. and the Vatican, Luigi 
Gedda’s Civic Committee used the influence of the Catholic Church to reach Italian 
society at the grass roots level. In addition to the influence of the Catholic Church, the 
U.S. was able to develop a robust surrogate network through pre-existing OSS contacts. 
CIA operative James Angleton was crucial in using his former OSS contacts and 
informants within the Italian security services to provide intelligence to the U.S. about 
Soviet activities in Italy. 
Also crucial to U.S. success in Italy was the role of positive inducements. The key 
inducement utilized by the U.S. to gain support from the Italian people was through the 
Marshall Plan. Marshall Plan aid was vital not only to assist in the rebuilding of war-torn 
Italy, but it also served as a psychological tool in promoting the U.S. and pro-democratic 
ideals. The Truman administration realized the impact of the Marshall Plan in Italy and 
all of Western Europe following WWII as the Soviet Union provided no such aid or 
assistance. U.S. aid provided relief for the Italian people in a time of dire hardship and 
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also bolstered the relationship between the Truman administration and Italian Prime 
Minister Alcide De Gasperi of the Christian Democratic Party. This relationship would, 
in turn, result in the U.S. supporting and assisting De Gasperi in his victory in the 1948 
election. 
B. CONCLUSIONS DERIVED FROM THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND 
MAIN HYPOTHESIS 
The presented research question asks: under what conditions is indirect coercion 
successful?  Analysis of the four case studies indicates that the underlying conditions that 
produced success through indirect coercion were those where high strategic priority was 
placed on the target by the sponsor over a protracted time period. The cases of Italy and 
Hezbollah demonstrate the high strategic importance the sponsor placed on the target due 
to both strategic location and regional goals. Once it is determined that a target nation or 
region is of high strategic value to the sponsor, the next condition that must be met is the 
sponsor’s ability and willingness to conduct a long-term and protracted campaign of 
indirect coercion. The Hezbollah and Italy case studies identified that overall success in 
reaching strategic goals was a result of committing to campaigns that spanned over 
several decades.   
The campaigns of indirect coercion in the above case studies were conducted in 
permissive environments. In these cases, the sponsor had the ability to develop networks 
and operate at the grass roots level to affect the outcome of the overall campaign. 
Operating in a non-permissive environment would obviously be more difficult and more 
time might be needed to succeed. In other words, a non-permissive environment would 
increase the difficulty of the campaign but the principles associated with success in a 
permissive setting remain. 
The main hypothesis of the thesis states: indirect coercion will be a more viable 
policy option for political and military decision makers if there is a better process to 
identify the conditions that make indirect coercion successful. For indirect coercion to be 
a viable option the target must have high strategic value and decision makers must be 
willing to commit the time and resources required for a successful campaign. Strategic 
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planners can devise indirect coercion contingency plans and then implement these plans 
if the conditions are met within the target nation. Maintaining and expanding pre-existing 
networks within and around a target nation can best provide the necessary ground truth 
and intelligence to assist decision makers to determine if indirect coercion is the best 
policy option available.  
C. CONCLUSIONS DERIVED FROM SUPPORTING HYPOTHESES 
Analysis of the case studies suggests that surrogate targeting and positive 
inducements are the most critical to success in a coercion campaign. Though all four 
factors analyzed through the sub-hypothesis are necessary and important to conducting 
indirect coercion, surrogate targeting and positive inducements had the greatest impact to 
the overall success or failure of a campaign.  
Successful coercion campaigns exemplified through the case studies of Hezbollah 
and Italy demonstrate the utility of targeting surrogate groups that are highly influential 
within the target society. Additionally, the identification of groups within the target 
population that share common goals and interests of the sponsor led to successful 
outcomes. The concept of sponsor/surrogate goal convergence has been previously 
conducted in thesis research pertaining to unconventional warfare (UW). The findings on 
factors pertaining to UW indicate that an objective alignment must exist between U.S. 
military objectives and the indigenous population’s political objectives.244 This same 
objective alignment also proves important in identifying surrogates to carry out indirect 
coercion. Equally important is the ability of the surrogates to disseminate pro-sponsor 
messages that reaches several facets of the target society.  
The use of positive inducements also proved crucial to successful indirect 
coercion as demonstrated in the Hezbollah and Italy case studies. The role of positive 
inducements supported the sponsor’s overall goals by displaying solidarity between the 
sponsor and the target population while simultaneously undermining the adversary’s 
efforts. Assisting the target population through aid and assistance programs that improve 
                                                 
244 Ryan C. Agee and Maurice K. DuClos, “Why UW: Factoring in the Decision Point for 
Unconventional Warfare” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA), 152. 
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quality of life demonstrated the utility of introducing positive inducements as a key tactic 
of indirect coercion.  
Also relevant to the success of indirect coercion in the Hezbollah and Italy cases 
were the persistent nature of the campaign and the high strategic value the sponsor placed 
on the target nation. The case of Hezbollah provides an example of an ongoing campaign 
whose success derives from over 30 years of support and influence by Iran. Additionally, 
U.S. efforts to dissuade Italy from falling into the communist sphere of influence began 
immediately following Allied victory in WWII and continued into the Cold War. 
Conversely, indirect coercion campaigns in Indonesia and Chile were characterized by 
short duration. 
Hezbollah and Italy exemplify the high strategic value that was placed upon them 
by the sponsor nation. Lebanon provides an optimal position for Iran to impact regional 
events and undermine Israeli and Western influence among the Lebanese population. 
Similarly, the strategic location of Italy provided the U.S. and NATO an ally that could 
allow unimpeded access to the Mediterranean. U.S. military bases in Italy provided a 
strategic foothold in Western Europe and the Mediterranean during the Cold War and 
remain relevant into the 21st Century. On the other hand, the short duration of U.S. 
efforts and the lack of any substantial positive inducements indicate a lessened strategic 
value that was placed on Indonesia in the 1950s. Additionally, the intrinsic strategic 
importance of Chile was inflated by corporate interests in the copper industry. It can also 
be assumed that the lack of strategic importance placed on Chile by the Nixon 
administration in 1970 can be attributed to other competing global interests outside of 
Latin America such as the Vietnam War. 
Based off the analysis of the four case studies the thesis sub-hypothesis’ have 
been rank ordered to demonstrate the importance each factor played in the success or 
failure of indirect coercion. To derive the below rank ordering we utilized the analysis of 
the sub-hypothesis factors for each case and determined what proved most crucial to the 




relevant and important to indirect coercion, the below rank ordering highlights the most 
crucial and necessary elements of the sub-hypothesis’. The sub-hypothesis factors are 
ranked 1–4 with 1 being the most crucial and 4 being less crucial to overall success or 
failure.  
Table 2.   Supporting Hypotheses Ranking 
Supporting Hypotheses Ranking Reasoning 
1. A process of identifying 
potential surrogates based on 
their influence on the population 
and their political goals increases 




Effective surrogate targeting resulted in a 
high rate of success in the Hezbollah and 
Italy cases. Viable surrogates initially 
yielded favorable results in 1964 Chilean 
elections; however, a lack of viable 
surrogates resulted in failure in 1970. 
Targeting militias as surrogates in 
Indonesia resulted in complete failure. 
2. A coercion campaign that is 
surrogate-centric, rather than 
sponsor-centric, is more likely to 
achieve the intended goals and 
less likely to be viewed as 




All four case studies indicate that a 
coercion campaign that is surrogate-
centric in nature will result in the desired 
outcome of the sponsor. This factor is 
ranked last due to the reasoning that a 
sponsor-centric campaign will more than 
likely result in failure. 
3. A successful campaign of 
indirect coercion can be either 
covert or overt in nature. 
 
3 
This factor is ranked third due to the 
reasoning that the covert activities 
associated with the case studies often 
served as a compliment to the overt 
aspects of a campaign. The covert/overt 
nature of an indirect coercion campaign 
can vary dependent upon the situation 
within the target nation. 
4. Positive inducements can 
increase the effectiveness of 
indirect coercion in political 




This factor was deemed most important 
as it directly resulted in overall success or 
failure. Success in the Hezbollah and 
Italy cases can be attributed to the 
protracted use of positive inducements. 
Failure in Indonesia can be attributed to a 
lack of any substantial positive 
inducements. Additionally, success in 
Chile in 1964 consisted of U.S. aid 
packages while no positive inducements 




This research on indirect coercion, its potential uses and best practices for its 
application, is not complete or even robust enough given the frequency of use throughout 
the world. The current conflicts in both the Ukraine and Syria both have external 
sponsors supporting surrogates operating on their behalf to shape the outcome in the most 
beneficial way for the sponsor. The results of this research are to provide 
recommendations for the best application of the strategic policy option of indirect 
coercion. 
Since 9/11, the U.S. government has strived to become better at incorporating all 
of the relevant agencies in executing its policies. In order to effectively conduct indirect 
warfare, this effort must continue. Elements of the government responsible for 
diplomacy, information/intelligence, military, and economic/financial must be leveraged 
in concert to execute indirect coercion. While a whole of government approach is 
required, three elements of the U.S. government must be more closely coordinated in 
order to conduct successful indirect coercion.  
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.S. Army Special Forces (USSF) 
both have experience and the charter to conduct indirect coercion and the U.S. 
Department of State is chartered to offer inducements. The CIA has the mission to 
conduct covert actions in support of foreign policy, while the USSF is tasked by the 
Department of Defense to conduct UW. The 911 report identified the need for a 
strengthened relationship between these two elements for the purpose of improving the 
U.S. capability to conduct these operations. The primacy of organizing, training and 
equipping surrogates falls mostly to USSF due to their charter to conduct UW. In order to 
support USSF in this effort, the continuous development of surrogate network must take 
place. These networks should be developed using the findings identified in this thesis. 
Standing networks will provide policy makers with the best possible surrogates to 
conduct indirect coercion when the time comes to do so. 
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E. CONCLUDING COMMENTS  
The value of this research is in highlighting the importance of aligning 
diplomatic, military, and economic capabilities to meet future global challenges. This 
concept of applying all instruments of statecraft to meet adversarial challenges is best 
described in the 2011 National Military Strategy, which states “we will support a whole-
of-nation deterrence approaches that blend economic, diplomatic, and military tools to 
influence adversary behavior.”245 The U.S. must be capable of applying indirect coercion 
to reach desired goals. The use of indirect coercion, if applied correctly, can provide a 
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America’s Miitary Leadership (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011), 8.  
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